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Abstract
A Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) is a new and promising approach
to provide security for physical systems and to address the problems associated
with traditional approaches. One of the most important performance metrics of a
PUF is the randomness of its generated response, which is presented via uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing. In this study, we implement three known PUF
schemes on an FPGA platform, namely SR Latch PUF, Basic RO PUF, and Anderson PUF. We then perform a thorough statistical analysis on their performance. In
addition, we propose the idea of the Hybrid PUF structure in which two (or more)
sources of randomness are combined in a way to improve randomness. We investigate two methods in combining the sources of randomness and we show that
the second one improves the randomness of the response, significantly. For example, in the case of combining the Basic RO PUF and the Anderson PUF, the
Hybrid PUF uniqueness is increased nearly 8%, without any pre-processing or
post-processing tasks required.
Two main categories of applications for PUFs have been introduced and analyzed: authentication and secret key generation. In this study, we introduce another important application for PUFs. In fact, we develop a secret sharing scheme
using a PUF to increase the information rate and provide cheater detection capability for the system. We show that, using the proposed method, the information
rate of the secret sharing scheme will improve significantly.

Keywords: FPGA, Hardware Security, Information Rate, Message Authentication Code, Physically Unclonable Functions, Robust Secret Sharing, VHDL
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The traditional approach to prevent passive physical attacks such as counterfeiting, cloning, reverse engineering and the insertion of malicious components include cryptographic primitives such as encryption/decryption algorithms, digital
signature schemes, and authentication codes. The problem with these types of
security measures is that, they rely on the protection of the secret keys which are
stored in non-volatile memory such as EEPROMs or fuses. The sensitive data
stored in such memory can be read out directly through invasive attacks [1]. To
counter this issue, expensive protective coatings are applied but still, the devices
are vulnerable to sophisticated physical attacks.
Therefore, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) are introduced to address
such problems. A PUF is a challenge-response primitive which is used in a physical system to provide the required security measures [1,13]. Instead of storing the
secret key in a memory, it can be intrinsically generated by the PUF. In fact, a PUF
generates a response to a given challenge. The idea behind the PUF is that, the
output response is totally random and unpredictable. It is also unique for different
instances, even if the two instances are exactly the same and use the exact same
components. This is because the PUF response depends solely on the unique and
random characteristics of physical devices, such as gate delays. In fact, the very
important feature of a PUF is its unclonability, i.e., even if an attacker has access
to the circuit and builds an exact same copy of it using the same components, the
1
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response of the new device to a given challenge would be different from that of
the original device to the same challenge.

1.1 PUF Constructions
A variety of PUF constructions have been introduced during the past ten years
[14]. Non-electrical PUFs include Optical PUFs [15, 16], Acoustical PUFs [17],
and Coating PUFs [18]. Optical PUFs use an optical micro-structure which is
built by mixing microscopic refractive glass spheres on a tiny transparent epoxy
plate [15]. This micro-structure is called a token. When a laser beam is applied
to the token, it will generate a random pattern that can be further processed to
produce the PUF response. The pattern generated by the token will substantially
change even with a slight change in the laser beam, in terms of its wavelength, angle, or focal distance. Acoustical PUFs are built upon the acoustical delay lines.
An alternating electrical signal is transformed to a mechanical vibration using a
transducer. This vibration propagates through a solid medium (acoustical line)
which includes random scatterers. At the other end of the line, the wave is transformed back to an electrical signal. The produced electrical signal has unique
properties which depend on the random physical characteristics of the acoustical
line. Therefore, this electrical signal can be used as the unique PUF response. In
Coating PUFs, a protective coating material is inserted onto the device using random dielectric particles which have random properties in size, shape and location.
In fact, in Coating PUFs, a random element is purposely inserted into the device in
order to provide more strength against physical attacks. Therefore, Coating PUFs
are different from other intrinsic PUFs in which the random element is intrinsic
to the device.
In addition, Electrical PUFs are categorized as Memory-based PUFs and Delaybased PUFs. Memory-based PUFs include SRAM, SR Latch, Flip-Flop, Butterfly,
and Buskeeper PUFs [19–24]. The idea behind memory-based PUFs is to bring
a bistable memory element (which can contain only 1 bit of information) into its

2
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metastable state where it is not clear to which stable state it will fall back. This
settling state is totally random and unpredictable for different memory elements
due to random physical variations.
Moreover, delay-based PUFs consist of Arbiter PUFs [2, 25], Ring-Oscillator
PUFs (RO PUFs) [3,8,13,26–28], and Glitch PUFs [8,9,29]. The random element
used in delay-based PUFs to produce response bits is the gate delay. For example,
in Ring Oscillator PUFs, two identical ring oscillators produce two clocks with
different frequencies. The frequency of each RO depends on the delay of the inverters used in the feedback loop of the ring oscillator. Therefore, the frequencies
can be compared to each other to produce one response bit, based on which ring
oscillator is faster. In this study, we focus on electrical PUFs and discuss their
characteristics in more details in Chapter 2.

1.2 PUF Performance Metrics and Properties
Some of the important performance metrics of PUFs include reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing [6, 30]. Reliability of a PUF is a measure of its
reproducibility. The reliability of an ideal PUF is 100%, i.e., the PUF generates
the same response to a given challenge at different instances of time and under
different environmental conditions. Uniqueness is a measure of inter-distance
variations of the response bits among different PUF instances. In other words, if
a specific challenge is applied at the same time and under the same conditions to
two identical PUF instances, the response of the two PUFs should be different.
Ideally, this value should be 50%. Uniqueness is one of the most important features of PUFs and represents the randomness of the PUF response bits [30]. Also,
uniformity of a PUF measures the ratio between the number of 1’s and the total
number of response bits. Uniformity of an ideal PUF is 50% meaning that, 50%
of the response bits are 1 and 50% are 0, and therefore, the PUF response does not
have a biased behavior towards a specific bit value. Another important factor of
a PUF which also represents the randomness of the PUF response is bit-aliasing.

3
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Bit-aliasing of a given bit position in the PUF response is its percentage Hamming
Weight (HW) across several PUF instances. Again, this value should be ideally
50% for all response bit positions. The definition of these properties along with
their formulations are provided in details in Chapter 3.

1.3 PUF Applications
Two main applications have been introduced for PUFs: device authentication and
secret key generation [1]. Authentication is performed in two steps. First, in the
enrollment phase, a trusted party (authentication authority) records a number of
challenge-response pairs (CRPs) in a database. Then, in the verification phase, a
random challenge chosen from the database is applied to the PUF under verification and if the generated response is ”close enough” to the recorded response, the
PUF is verified to be authentic. Figure 1.1 shows a general PUF-based authentication scheme [1].

Enrollment
Phase

Verification
Phase

Authentic
PUF

PUF under
verification
Challenge Response
Record

Secure database
Challenge-Response Pairs
Challenge1 Response1
Challenge2 Response2
Challenge3 Response3
Challenge4 Response4
Challenge5 Response5
…
…

Selected Generated
Challenge Response

Corresponding
Response

Match?

Figure 1.1: A general PUF-based authentication scheme [1]

One of the most important requirements of a practical PUF which is utilized in
a device authentication process is a large set of challenge-response pairs (CRPs).
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Because the CRP which is chosen by the authentication authority is transferred
over an insecure channel, an attacker can capture and reuse this information to
attack the authentication system. In order to prevent such replay attacks, each
challenge-response pair should be used only once during the authentication process. Therefore, the utilized PUF should provide a large number of challengeresponse pairs so that a device can be authenticated a significant number of times
before the CRP set is exhausted.
In secret key generation, on the other hand, a specific key should be regenerated for unlimited number of times. In other words, because the secret key is not
stored in the system, and the PUF circuit produces it whenever it is needed, the
regenerated response (key) should be 100% noise-free. As proposed by Suh et al.,
the secret key generator based on PUF works as follows [1]: in the initialization
phase, a specific challenge is applied to the PUF and a response is generated, as
shown in Fig. 1.2. Then, using an error correcting code such as BCH, the error
correcting syndrome (called Helper Data) for that response is computed. The applied challenge and the syndrome are then stored publicly on a chip or a server.
In the reconstruction phase, the same challenge is applied to the PUF and the
noisy output will be corrected using the computed syndrome to produce the same
response as the secret key. Note that, the publicly stored syndrome reveals information about the PUF response and thus the secret key. Therefore, if a q-bit secret
key is needed and the syndrome bit-size is b, the number of PUF response bits
should be at least |r| = b + q [1].

1.4 Thesis Outline and Contributions
In Chapter 2, we discuss different memory-based and delay-based PUFs in more
details. More specifically, the construction and properties of SRAM, SR Latch,
Flip-Flop, Butterfly, Buskeeper, Arbiter, Ring Oscillator, and Glitch PUFs are discussed. Additionally, more details about the PUF applications are provided. The
first contribution of this thesis is introduced in Chapter 3. It includes proposing a
novel Hybrid PUF structure to improve the randomness of the generated response.

5
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Challenge5 Syndrome5
…
…

Figure 1.2: A secret key generation scheme using PUF [1]
In fact, two known PUF schemes are combined in a way to take advantage of both
of them. We analyze the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing and compare it with other implemented schemes. The second contribution is discussed in Chapter 4. We propose
an efficient secret sharing scheme based on PUF properties. The information rate
which is the main factor in assessing the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme
is increased using our method. Our proposed scheme also provides cheater detection capability for the system. Finally, conclusion and future work are briefly
discussed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 2
Literature Review
In this chapter, we briefly review the proposed schemes in the literature related
to both PUF applications and PUF design. As mentioned in the previous chapter,
both memory-based and delay-based PUFs are chosen, which include SRAM, SR
Latch, Flip-Flop, Butterfly, Buskeeper, Arbiter, Ring Oscillator, and Glitch PUFs.
We describe the PUF structures and explain how the response bits are generated.
Also, each structure’s advantages and disadvantages are mentioned.

2.1 PUF Applications
In this section, we briefly review the proposed works published in the open literature regarding the applications of PUFs.

2.1.1 Authentication
As discussed before, in device authentication, there is no need to generate 100%
noise-free response bits. In fact, if the generated response is ”close enough” to
the one stored in the database, the PUF under verification is authenticated. Therefore, the failure rate of the authentication system which is defined as the device
misidentification probability [30], depends on the reliability and uniqueness properties of the utilized PUF. It also depends on the number of PUF response bits.
7
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In other words, a longer PUF response can authenticate a bigger population of
devices with less failure rate [6]. In addition, the resilience of the authentication
system against the replay attacks depends on the number of challenge-response
pairs provided by the PUF. Thus, all the works which are proposed to either improve the reliability, uniqueness, number of response bits, and/or number of CRPs,
can be considered as works related to the authentication application.

2.1.2 Secret Key Generation
The main building block in a secret key generator scheme using PUF is the error
correcting code (ECC) which is used to produce a 100% noise-free response. The
use of 2D Hamming codes for error correction is suggested in [12]. Also, using
a more realistic model of PUFs noisy properties, Suh et al. suggested the use of
BCH codes as the ECC [31]. In addition, a new syndrome coding scheme that
restricts the amount of leaked information by the PUF error-correcting codes is
proposed in [32].
A fuzzy extractor implementation on FPGAs is proposed in [33] to generate
uniformly distributed and noise-free cryptographic keys. The proposed fuzzy extractor has two stages; the first stage generates a noise-free key using an ECC,
and the second stage transforms the response using a universal hash function to
achieve a uniform or any other required distribution of keys. A 128-bit secret
key using an RO-PUF is proposed in [13] using a fuzzy extractor which includes
a BCH(255,37,45) error correcting code. In addition, Maes et al. proposed a
practical low overhead secret key generation called PUFKY, which can generate
a 128-bit secret key with a failure rate of 10−9 , in 5.62 ms, and with low area
overhead [7].

2.2 Memory-based PUFs
As discussed before, a bistable memory cell which has 2 stable states (0 and 1),
goes to the metastable state for a short period of time and then settles in one of

8
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the 2 states. This settling state is random and unpredictable for each memory cell.
Therefore, this random behavior is used to build a PUF which produces random
response bits. For example, as shown in Fig. 2.1, an SRAM memory cell consists
of 2 cross-coupled inverters at its core. The transient behavior of an SRAM cell
when it is powered up is what an SRAM PUF is built upon [19]. Typical SRAM
cells are designed to have perfectly matched inverters. However, due to uncontrollable process variations, the strength of the inverters will not match in an SRAM
cell. Based on which inverter is stronger, the memory cell will settle in one of the
stable states. If the difference between the strength of the inverters is significant,
the produced response bit (which is the settling state of the cell) will be stable. On
the other hand, if the inverters are somehow equally strong, the settling state on
each power-up will be different due to noise effects, resulting in an unstable bit.

VDD

GND

Figure 2.1: SRAM cell logic circuit
The power-up state of 8190 bytes of SRAM from different memory blocks
on different FPGA boards are collected in [19]. The uniqueness is reported to
be 49.97% and the reliability is shown to be 96.43% at normal conditions and
88% for higher temperature conditions. The main drawback of this PUF scheme
is that, the response bit is generated only on the power-up state of the circuit. In
other words, the response bit cannot be re-generated while the circuit is operational. This drawback makes the SRAM PUF an impractical PUF because for
each sample of the response bit, one has to turn the circuit off and on again.
Other memory-based PUFs are depicted in Fig. 2.2. The basic principle of
these PUFs is the same as that of the SRAM PUF: random mismatch between
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nominally matched cross-coupled devices. For example, in the SR Latch PUF, 2
cross-coupled NAND (or NOR) gates constitute a simple SR Latch.

Reset

Response

Response
Latch

(a) SR Latch PUF cell

preset

Latch

(b) D Flip-Flop PUF cell

Response

Latch

Latch
clear

(c) Butterfly PUF cell

Bus

Response
(d) Buskeeper PUF cell

Figure 2.2: Different memory-based PUF structures
In the NAND-based SR Latch, when the Reset signal is 0, the output bit is 1.
When the reset is released, the output bit will converge to either 0 or 1 depending on the internal mismatch between the 2 gates. 128 NOR-based SR Latches
are instantiated on 19 ASICs manufactured in 130 nm CMOS technology [20].
The uniqueness and reliability at nominal conditions are reported as 50.55% and
96.96%, respectively. The main advantage of the SR Latch PUF is that the PUF
response bits can be re-generated at any time when the circuit is powered and operational. In fact, we can take many samples from the response bit to analyze the
PUF performance by connecting a clock to the Reset signal. In addition, a majority voting technique can be applied on the samples to generate more reliable bits.
Flip-Flop, Butterfly, and Buskeeper PUFs behavior and principle are basically
similar to those of the SRAM PUF. Like the SRAM PUF, the response bits generated by these PUFs are obtained only on the device power-up state. The power up
states of 4096 Flip-Flops on 3 different FPGA boards are measured in [21]. After
applying simple majority voting techniques on the output bits, the uniqueness and
reliability are estimated as 50% and 95%, respectively. Also, implementation of

C HAPTER 2. L ITERATURE R EVIEW
64 Butterfly cells on 36 FPGA boards yields a uniqueness of approximately 50%
and a reliability of 95% [22]. Finally, a 8192-bit Buskeeper PUF has been implemented on an ASIC platform in [34]. The uniqueness is estimated as 48.88%. At
normal conditions, the reliability is reported as 95.84% and under higher temperature conditions, it is shown to be approximately 83%.

2.3 Delay-based PUFs
2.3.1 Arbiter PUF
Figure 2.3 depicts a basic Arbiter PUF design proposed in [2]. The basic idea
of this scheme is to let a rising-edge signal travel through two different delay
paths. At the end of the delay paths, an arbiter circuit decides which path is the
winner of the race. The arbiter circuit has 2 inputs and 1 output. If the rising edge
arrives at the first input before it arrives at the second input, the output will be
1, and 0 otherwise. The delay paths are implemented as a chain of switch boxes.
Each switch box has a select signal which determines the connection between the
2 inputs and the 2 outputs. If the select is 0 the connection is straight and if it
is 1, the connection is crossed. As shown in the figure, the switch box can be
implemented using two 2 − to − 1 multiplexers. Since there are a number of
switch boxes in the chain, the set of select signals can be considered as the PUF
challenge bits, and the outputs for each configuration can be considered as the
PUF response bits. The structure of the utilized switch boxes, and thus the delay
lines must be nominally perfectly symmetrical so that the output bits depend only
on the random physical and manufacturing variations. Also, the arbiter circuit
must be completely fair, i.e., it must not have a biased behavior towards a specific
bit. As suggested by Lin et al. in [35], a basic SR latch is the best option for a fair
arbiter because of its symmetric construction.
There is a non-trivial chance that, both delay lines are almost identical. In this
case, the rising edge arrives at the 2 inputs of the arbiter at nearly the same time.

11
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Therefore, the arbiter goes into its metastable state and after a short period of time,
it will settle down in one of its 2 stable states. Although the output in this case is
totally random, it is not static for each device and therefore, it is the main cause
of unreliability in an Arbiter PUF.

Challenge



…..
Arbiter

Response bit

…..
Switch Box

0
1

0
1

Figure 2.3: A basic Arbiter PUF design [2]
Gassend et al. [36] implemented the basic Arbiter PUF design on a set of
FPGA chips. This implementation lacks low-level control over the placement
and routing of the delay lines. The reliability is reported to be 99.9% under normal conditions, which is a high value. However, the uniqueness of this scheme
has an extremely low value: 1.05%. Hence, this Arbiter PUF implementation is
very biased which is a result of non-symmetric delay line design. Another implementation is performed by the same group on ASIC platform which controls the
placement and routing of the switch boxes. The uniqueness is shown to improve
significantly: 23%. But, it is still far from the ideal 50%. The reliability is also
shown to be very high: 99.3% under normal conditions and 95.18% under high
temperature conditions.
The most important issue with the basic Arbiter PUF is its weak resilience
against modeling attacks. The digital delay line is additive by nature, meaning
that, the total delay of the delay line paths is the sum of the delay of the switch
boxes in the chain. Therefore, an attacker will be able to predict unknown responses as accurately as possible after monitoring a specific number of challenge
response pairs. It is shown in [25] that the basic Arbiter PUF scheme is 96.45%
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predictable after observing 5000 CRPs. Hence, it is easily broken through modeling attacks. Feed-forward Arbiter PUF is thus proposed in [2] to increase the
resilience of Arbiter PUFs against modeling attacks. The idea of feed-forward Arbiter is shown in Fig. 2.4. As we can observe, the select signal of a switch box in
the main delay path is determined by the inserted arbiter A∗ . The implementation
results on ASIC platform indicate that the uniqueness of the new Arbiter PUF is
increased to 38%, while its reliability is decreased to 90.16% under high temperature conditions. The reliability is decreased because the number of arbiters are
increased in the design and as discussed before, each arbiter can go to a metastable
state which results in noisy outputs. This scheme is also shown to be vulnerable
against modeling attacks [37, 38]. In fact, the feed-forward Arbiter PUF is shown
to be 97.5% predictable after observing 50000 CRPs.

Challenge



…..
Arbiter

Response bit

…..
Switch Box

Arbiter
A*

Figure 2.4: The feed-forward Arbiter PUF design [2]

Majzoobi et al. proposed a more advanced technique to make Arbiter PUFs
resilient against modeling attacks in [39]. In this technique, multiple arbiter PUFs
are used in parallel and their outputs are XOR’ed to generate the response bits.
Although this technique makes modeling attacks much harder, it is still shown
that modeling attack against such scheme is feasible. Rührmair et al. show that
the new scheme with 64 switching boxes and 3 parallel arbiters is 99% predictable
with 60000 challenge-response pairs being observed [38].
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2.3.2 RO PUF
Figure 2.5 shows a basic RO PUF structure proposed in [1]. It includes N identical
u-stage ring oscillators shown in Fig. 2.6. Note that, the number of stages in a
ring oscillator is the number of inverters in the feedback loop. The ring oscillator
generates a clock signal, the frequency of which is directly related to the delay of
the inverters.

ܴܱଵ 

Counter

ܴܱଶ 

>?

Response
0 or 1

Counter
ܴܱே 

Challenge
Ref_Clock

Ref_Counter

Run Time?

Figure 2.5: An architecture of an RO PUF [1]
The outputs of the ring oscillators are connected to the inputs of two N −to−1
multiplexers. A 2 log2 N-bit challenge selects a pair of ring oscillators, the outputs
of which will be connected to the clock inputs of the two counters.

odd number of inverters (u)

Enable

…

Figure 2.6: A basic ring oscillator circuit
The two counters will start counting at the same time and after a specific period of time (determined by the Ref Counter as Run Time), the counter outputs
are compared. If the upper counter has a greater value, the response bit will be
1, otherwise 0. Theoretically, the oscillation frequency of all the ring oscillators

C HAPTER 2. L ITERATURE R EVIEW

15

should be the same because they are exactly identical. However, due to the inherent inter-chip and intra-chip process variations, as well as the environmental
conditions, the delays of the inverters will vary across different ring oscillators,
thus affecting the oscillation frequency of the ROs [28]. Note that, the pair of
ring oscillators that generate two oscillation frequencies which differ more, will
produce a more reliable response bit, because the environmental changes will less
likely reverse the relation between their frequencies. In other words, the reliability
of a PUF depends greatly on the difference between the oscillation frequencies of
any RO pair. Additionally, one of the advantages of the RO PUF is that, the ring
oscillator can be implemented as a hard macro and instantiated as many times as
needed in the top-level design. Using this technique, all the ROs will be identical
in terms of placement and routing. A large scale characterization of RO PUF is
provided in [26]. The uniqueness is shown to be 47.31% and the reliability is
measured to be 99.14% under normal conditions.
In order to improve the reliability of an RO PUF, a 1-out-of-γ masking was
introduced in [1]. In this scheme, the RO pair that has the maximum frequency
distance among other pairs are selected and their frequencies are compared to
produce the response bit. The reliability of this PUF scheme implemented on 15
FPGA chips shows a uniqueness of 46.15% and a reliability of 99.52% under normal conditions [1]. The main drawback of this scheme is the huge area overhead.
In fact, γ times more area is used to produce the same number of response bits.
Maiti et al. addressed this drawback by proposing and constructing a configurable
RO [3]. Figure 2.7 depicts their proposed 3-stage configurable RO, each stage of
which can fit into 1 SLICE.

G1


G2

G3

Enable

Figure 2.7: Maiti’s Configurable RO [3]

C HAPTER 2. L ITERATURE R EVIEW

Despite the basic RO (Fig. 2.6) that has only one path in the feedback loop, in
this configurable RO the three signals, G1 ,G2 , and G3 can select the inverters to
be included in the loop. This provides us with 8 different ring oscillators (because
of the delay variations of different LUTs and wires within the FPGA), while it
occupies the same amount of area (1 CLB) compared to a basic RO. Similar to
the 1-out-of-γ masking scheme, a configuration for the one pair of configurable
ROs which has the maximum frequency distance among the 8 configurations can
be selected in order to improve the PUF reliability. In summary, the configurable
ROs can be used in a 1-out-of-γ manner (where γ = 8), while occupying the same
amount of area. Another important advantage of the Maiti’s configurable RO is its
ability to create 8 response bits instead of a single response bit. Implementation
results for 64-, 128-, and 256-RO PUFs under varying voltage and temperature
shows that, using the 1-out-of-8 scheme with the configurable RO improves the
PUF reliability while maintaining a high value of uniqueness.
In addition, Xin et. al improve Maiti’s configurable RO by increasing the
number of possible configurations to 256 [4]. Figure 2.8 shows their proposed
configurable 3-stage RO which can also fit into 1 CLB. As we can see, similar to
Maiti’s design, each stage is implemented in 1 SLICE. However, a latch is inserted
in all SLICES and the signal sel determines whether or not a latch should be included in the path coming from the preceding stage. Because the delay associated
with each latch is random and unpredictable due to manufacturing variations, it
can be considered as another random factor in the PUF design that helps enhance
the PUF unclonability. Note that, the other select signals, bxi , have the same
functionality as select signals, Gi , in Maiti’s RO.
Because there are 8 configuration signals in the ring oscillator, namely sel[3..0]
and bx[3..0], 256 different RO configurations are available, each of which can
generate different oscillation frequencies. Thus, this scheme is able to generate
even more response bits for a given challenge while occupying the same amount
of area. It is shown that the reliability of this RO PUF design with 128 ROs is
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Figure 2.8: Xin’s Configurable RO in One CLB [4]
98.98% and the uniqueness is reported to be 40% for the same number of ROs.
In addition, a multi-voltage RO PUF is proposed in [5] as depicted in Fig. 2.9.
The idea behind this scheme is the dependency of the combinational path of digital
cells delay on the supply voltage. As we can see in Fig. 2.9, the supply voltage
of each column of inverters is different and can be selected among d different
values. Because the oscillation frequency of each RO depends on the delay of
the inverters included in its feedback loop, and the delay of the inverters depends
on process variations as well as the supply voltage, different ROs generate clock
signals with different frequencies. The authors claim that this new RO PUF can
produce a higher number of response bits, consumes less amount of area, and is
more reliable in case of temperature variations. It can generate a higher number
of response bits because the supply voltage of the different columns is considered
as another random factor that can directly influence on the oscillation frequencies
of the ROs. Therefore, by changing the supply voltages of the inverter columns,
each pair of ROs can generate a set of different response bits. However, one of the
important drawbacks of this scheme is that, the inverters used in different columns
are not identical any more. Thus, if an attacker gains access to the supply voltage
configuration of a chip through an invasive attack, they would most likely estimate
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the most probable response bits.
Column (1) Column (2) Column (3)

Column (u)
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Figure 2.9: Multi-voltage RO PUF [5]
The 1-out-of-γ masking scheme proposed in [1] is a good example of PUF
post-processing. In fact, an additional processing is performed on the ring oscillator frequencies to provide more reliable response bits. In addition, the previous
schemes suffer from the fact that, the number of PUF response bits and the number of challenge-response pairs provided by the PUF are limited to the area. The
idea of RO frequencies post-processing is further investigated in [6]. In this study,
an identity-mapping function along with a quantization process are applied on the
RO frequencies in order to increase the number of challenge-response pairs. The
proposed scheme is shown in Fig. 2.10.

Digital
Challenge

Physical Quantity

Sample
Measurement

Real Value

Identity
Mapping

Digital

Quantization
Response
Helper Data

Figure 2.10: The RO PUF with identity-mapping [6]
In the sample measurement phase, the challenge, c, selects each ring oscillator
one at a time and the selected RO frequency is measured and recorded. Therefore,
the ”Physical Quantity” in the figure refers to the RO frequencies. In the identitymapping phase, any subset of RO frequencies whose cardinality is greater than 2
is selected and a corresponding Q-value is computed for each subset. The ”Real
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Value” in the figure refers to this Q-value because it is not a digital value and
it can have more than 2 values. Therefore, a quantization process is required to
transform these real values to digital strings which are used as the PUF response
bits. It is shown that, the proposed scheme can provide upto 2N − N − 1 response
bits, where N is the number of ring oscillators. Therefore, it is observed that, with
a small number of ring oscillators (and thus, a small area cost), a large number
of response bits and a large set of CRPs can be produced. The only expense that
is paid is the additional post-processing applied on the RO outputs. Experimental data obtained from an implementation on 125 FPGAs shows a uniqueness of
49.99% which is nearly ideal. Also, the reliability is demonstrated to be 90%
under high temperature conditions (70 ◦ C).
Another good example of post-processing on the generated RO frequencies
is the one proposed by Maes et al. in [7] and shown in Fig. 2.11. There are β
batches of ring oscillators where each batch contains α ring oscillators. In total,
there are β × α number of ROs. The design of each batch is similar to the basic
RO structure shown in Fig. 2.5, i.e., all α ring oscillators are fed into an α − to − 1
multiplexer and the output of the multiplexer is connected to the clock input of a
counter. The counter counts for a specific period of time which is determined by
a reference counter. The count value after this run time represents the frequency
of the selected RO. The frequencies of β ROs selected from each batch are measured simultaneously and an h-bit response is generated based on the ordering of
the measured frequencies. Therefore, the total number of generated response bits
is equal to h × α. The process of encoding the β frequency measurements and
transforming them into an h-bit response is performed in 3 steps. First, the measured frequencies are normalized by removing the oscillator-dependent structural
bias. The bias value is shown to be the mean value of the RO frequency which is
estimated by averaging the frequency over many measurements on many devices.
The estimated mean value for different ROs are called the normalization terms
which need to be computed only once and can be stored in a ROM for later use.
Subtracting this mean value from the measured frequency results in the normal-
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ized frequency. The normalized frequencies are then transformed into an h′ -bit
vector based on the order of the frequencies using the proposed Lehmer-Gray Encoder. It is shown that, some bits among the generated h′ bits are biased and/or
dependent to each other. Therefore, in order to increase the entropy and thus, the
randomness of the response bits, a simple compression is performed on the h′
bits. In fact, the bits which suffer the most from the bias and/or dependencies are
XOR’ed with each other to produce an h-bit response, where h′ ≤ h.
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Figure 2.11: The RO PUF structure proposed in [7]

Possible modeling attacks that can be applied on the Basic RO PUF are discussed in [38]. It is mentioned that, if an attacker can select the challenge-response
pairs adaptively, they can sort the RO frequencies in a specified order without
knowing the exact frequency of each RO. Then, the attacker will be able to predict the responses with a correctness rate of 100% because the absolute value of
the RO frequency does not have any effect on the generated response. In fact,
the response is produced based on the ranking of the RO frequencies. Maiti et
al. investigate the security of their proposed RO PUF with identity-mapping ( [6])
against this modeling attack. Since the produced response of this scheme does
not solely depend on the frequency ranking of the ROs, it is shown to be resilient
against this attack. In other words, because the RO frequencies are first transformed into Q-values, and then the Q-values are transformed into binary strings
using the quantization function, the sorting technique proposed in [38] will not
work against this scheme. Additionally, five other cases are considered to analyze
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the security of the RO PUF with identity-mapping in [6]: uniformity of response,
response conditioned by challenge, inter-response dependency test, differential attack, and reverse engineering attack. The proposed scheme is shown to be resilient
in all cases [6].
Finally, the effect of the FPGA chip aging on the Basic RO PUF is investigated
in [40]. Aging is considered to be an irreversible temporal change that has the potential of affecting the reliability and randomness of the PUF response and thus,
making the PUF unsuitable for authentication and secret key generation applications. It is shown that, the reliability of the RO PUF is reduced by 6% with aging.
However, the uniqueness and entropy of the RO PUF do not seem to be affected
by this parameter. Therefore, the security of the RO PUF is not compromised with
aging.

2.3.3 Glitch PUF
Any combinatorial logic has a glitch behavior. The occurrence, the number and
the shape of the glitches on the output of the combinatorial logic is partially random and device-specific depending on the random process variations. The glitch
behavior of such circuit can thus be converted into random response bits. In other
words, Glitch PUFs produce response bits from the unwanted glitches in the circuit.
Anderson PUF proposed in [8] is an example of Glitch PUFs. As discussed before, in order to have a set of identical ring oscillators in terms of placement and
routing, one should create a ring oscillator as a hard macro and instantiate it as
many times as needed in the top level PUF design. The drawback of this approach
is that, the design flow becomes too complicated with the use of hard macros. In
fact, the designer must work at a lower level of abstraction than Register-Transfer
Level (RTL). Also, routed hard macros tend to cause longer run times in the Place
and Route (PAR), and might even cause PAR to crash. The Anderson PUF addresses these issues. It does not need the use of hard macros and can be easily
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embedded in a design’s HDL. Figure 2.12 depicts the proposed PUF circuit.
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Figure 2.12: The proposed Anderson PUF circuit [8]
Two LUTs within a slice are used as 16-bit shift registers. LUT A is initialized
with 0x5555 and LUT B is initialized with 0xAAAA. Therefore, shift register A
generates a bit stream of 0101... and shift register B generates a bit stream of
1010....Note that, these two bit streams are complement of each other. Because
the delays associated with the shift registers and the multiplexers they drive are
different due to process variations, the output N2 can be either a constant 0 or a
short positive spike. The presence or absence of a positive spike on N2 is utilized
to decide the response bit. This process is shown in Fig. 2.13. The response bit
is 1 if a spike is applied to the asynchronous preset input of the flip-flop, and 0
otherwise. The PUF circuit shown in Fig. 2.12 generates only 1 response bit. This
circuit can be instantiated as many times as needed to create a multi-bit response.
0 or glitch
N2
PRE
Q

D

0 or 1
(response bit)

clk
Flip-Flop

Figure 2.13: PUF response bit generation [8]
The aforementioned design along with a pulse width tuning approach are implemented on a Virtex-5 65 nm FPGA and the performance is analyzed under
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temperature variation. It is shown that, on average, 3.6% of signature bits are
unstable under high temperature conditions, which is in line with other published
PUF circuits. Also the uniqueness is reported 48.28%. Another implementation
of a 64-bit Anderson PUF on 5 Spartan-6 FPGAs in [41] shows a uniqueness of
45.62%.
Another example of Glitch PUFs is the one proposed in [29] and later improved in [9]. Figure 2.14 depicts the Glitch PUF proposed in [9]. The generated
response bit is the parity of the number of glitches that occur during a specific
period of time. In fact, the output of the combinatorial logic, which is chosen to
be the AES S-Box as an example, is connected to a toggle flip-flop. If the number
of glitches is odd, the response will be 1 and if it is even, the response will be
0. To improve the reliability of the proposed scheme, the unstable bits are identified in a pre-processing stage and the information about them is stored in the
system. These unstable bits are ignored when the PUF is actually used in practice.
This technique is called bit-masking and adds extra overhead to the system but
it is shown to improve the reliability, significantly. The proposed scheme along
with the bit-masking technique is implemented on 16 FPGA chips and the reliability is reported to be 98.7% under normal conditions. However, it is shown that
the applied bit-masking technique ignores almost 38% of the response bits. This
demonstrates that, the proposed Glitch PUF without the bit-masking technique
suffers from a substantial instability. Since the bit-masking technique is a general
technique and not specific to Glitch PUFs, it is concluded that the proposed Glitch
PUF does not show a suitable practical behavior. In addition, the uniqueness is
reported to be 35%.
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Figure 2.14: The Glitch PUF [9]
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Table 2.1: Comparing the performance of different PUF schemes in the literature
in terms of uniqueness and reliability (%)
Reliability
Higher Temperature
Conditions

PUF Scheme

Uniqueness

Normal
Conditions

Basic RO [26]

47.31

99.14

96

RO with 1-out-of-γ
masking [1]

46.15

99.52

N/A

40

98.98

N/A

49.99

99

90

48.4

98

91

Anderson [8]

48.28

N/A

96.4

Anderson [41]

45.62

N/A

N/A

SR Latch [20]
SR Latch [34]

50.55
37.01

96.96
96.6

N/A
87.29

Configurable RO [4]
RO with identitymapping [6]
RO with LehmerGray Encoder [7]

Platform
Xilinx Spartan
3E FPGA
Xilinx Virtex 4
LX25 FPGA
Xilinx Spartan
3E FPGA
Xilinx Spartan
3E FPGA
Xilinx Spartan 6
XC6SLX45 FPGA
Xilinx Virtex
5 FPGA
Xilinx Spartan 6
XC6SLX45 FPGA
130 nm CMOS ASIC
65 nm CMOS ASIC

Number
of
Boards

Any
Processing
Applied?

125

No

15

Yes

4

Yes

125

Yes

10

Yes

36

No

5

No

19
192

No
No

Table 2.1 summarizes the performance of the PUFs discussed in this chapter in
terms of uniqueness and reliability. Note that, a fair comparison between different
PUFs performance can be done only when they are all implemented on the same
platform, under the same conditions, and even designed by the same developer.

Chapter 3
Implementation Results
In this chapter, we provide the implementation results of different PUF schemes in
terms of reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing. First, the formal definitions and formulations of these PUF performance metrics are presented. Then
more details on the implemented schemes, design parameters, and measurement
system are provided. Finally, the implementation results are presented and discussed.

3.1 PUF Performance Metrics
In this section, four important PUF characteristics including reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing are discussed. The randomness of a PUF response is determined by its entropy. However, it is very difficult to estimate and
calculate the entropy of a PUF response because one cannot learn the complete
details about the statistical distribution of the PUF responses which is generally
determined by very complex and even chaotic physical processes [34]. So, the
randomness of the PUF responses is truly indicated by uniqueness, uniformity,
and bit-aliasing [6].
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3.1.1 Reliability
Reliability of a given PUF instance is a measure of stability of the PUF response
bits to a given challenge at different times and under different conditions [3]. Ideally, the value of reliability is 100%, meaning that the PUF under study generates
the exact same response to a given challenge at different times and under different
conditions, such as different temperatures or different supply voltage values. It is
defined as [3]:
m
m−1
X X
HD(ri , rj )
2
) × 100%
Reliability = (1 −
m × (m − 1)
a

(3.1)

i=1 j=i+1

where m is the number of response samples, a is the number of response bits, and
HD is the Hamming distance between two response samples ri and rj . So, we
basically take m number of samples of the response of a given PUF instance to
a specific challenge, calculate the Hamming distance between any two responses
(where the total number of unique comparisons between m responses is

m×(m−1)
),
2

and calculate the average number of unstable bits among a response bits. This
value represents the average instability or intra-distance of the given PUF instance.
Finally, reliability is derived by reducing this value from 100%.

3.1.2 Uniqueness
Another important feature of a PUF is its uniqueness. Uniqueness is a measure
of inter-distance variations of the response bits of different PUF instances. In
other words, if a specific challenge is applied at the same time and under the same
conditions to two identical PUF instances, the response of the two PUFs should
be different. Ideally, this value should be 50%. It is calculated as [3]:
g
g−1
X
X
2
HD(ri , rj )
Uniqueness =
× 100%
g × (g − 1) i=1 j=i+1
a

(3.2)

where g is the number of PUF instances under study, a is the number of response
bits, and HD is the Hamming distance between two response samples ri and
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rj . The same challenge is applied to g identical PUF instances and the average
Hamming distance between the response bits of any two PUF circuits is calculated
(where the total number of unique comparisons between g different PUF circuits
is

g×(g−1)
).
2

3.1.3 Uniformity
Uniformity is the measure of uniform distribution of 0’s and 1’s in the response
of a single PUF instance. It is defined as [14, 42]:
1 XX
ri,j × 100%
Unif ormity =
m × a i=1 j=1
m

a

(3.3)

where m is the number of response samples, a is the number of response bits, and
ri,j is the j-th bit of the i-th response sample. Ideally, uniformity should be 50%
meaning that 50% of the response bits are 1 and 50% are 0.

3.1.4 Bit-aliasing
Another important indicator of a PUF randomness and unclonability is bit-aliasing.
The bit-aliasing of the j-th response bit is the average Hamming weight of that bit
position across several PUF instances. Ideally, this value should be 0.5 for all bit
positions in the PUF response. It is defined as [26]
1X
ri,j
Bit − aliasingj =
g i=1
g

(3.4)

for all j, 0 ≤ j ≤ a, where g is the number of PUF instances and ri,j is the j-th
bit of the i-th PUF instance response.

3.2 Design concepts: Basic PUFs
Among the memory-based PUF schemes, the SR Latch PUF is chosen because of
its ability to re-generate the response bits when the circuit is powered and opera-

C HAPTER 3. I MPLEMENTATION R ESULTS

28

tional. We also implement the Basic RO and Anderson PUFs and we evaluate and
compare their performance through statistical analysis.

3.2.1 SR Latch PUF
A NAND-based SR Latch PUF is implemented as shown in Fig. 3.1. A clock is
connected to the reset signal and whenever the level of the clock is 1, the output
bit is read and recorded. Note that, if we need to obtain an N-bit response, we
have to instantiate the SR Latch unit N times and obtain 1 bit from each unit.

clock

D

Q
LUT
(NAND)

LUT
(NAND)
D

Q

ܳ

ܳത

D

Q

Response

D
Q

Figure 3.1: The NAND-based SR Latch [10]
In order to achieve the best results for the SR Latch PUF in terms of randomness of the response bits, some details related to the implementation of the SR
Latch have to be considered [10]. First of all, the flip-flops used on the input side
of the latch are necessary to reduce the skew of the clock signal. The flip-flop
used on the output bit (Q signal) is used to balance the capacitive load of the Q
signal with the capacitive load of the Q signal [10]. Note that, our platform in
this study is a Virtex II Pro FPGA evaluation board. Each CLB of a Virtex II Pro
FPGA has four SLICEs, and each SLICE contains two lookup tables and two flipflops. Therefore, each lookup table (NAND gate) along with its input and output
flip-flops are implemented in a single SLICE. So, the SR Latch shown in Fig. 3.1
requires only two SLICEs which can be placed in a single CLB. However, in or-
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der to guarantee the symmetrical implementation of the Q and Q signals, the two
SLICEs have to be placed in two separate CLBs. Even the distance between the
two CLBs is important and has direct effect on the PUF performance. A thorough
analysis is performed on the effect of the placement of the CLBs on the randomness of the generated response bits in [10]. Based on our initial implementations
and experiments, we obtained the best results when the distance between the two
CLBs is 1 CLB. In other words, if one of the lookup tables along with the corresponding flip-flops is fitted in the SLICE X0Y0, the other lookup table and its
flip-flops are implemented in the SLICE X0Y4.

3.2.2 Basic RO PUF
As discussed before, an RO PUF generates the response bits by comparing the
frequencies of two different ring oscillators (Fig. 2.5). Note that, the counter size
and run time should be carefully selected because, as we can observe, the response
of the PUF relies on the difference between the oscillation frequency of different
ring oscillators. Thus, the run time should be long enough to differentiate between
the oscillation frequency of different ring oscillators. On the other hand, it should
not be too long to cause a counter overflow. Also, the counter size should be
big enough to prevent a counter overflow. A more detailed discussion on how to
select the counter size and run time is provided in [13]. Also note that, in order
to generate an M-bit response, M different challenges (where each challenge is
2 log2 N bits wide) have to be applied to make M comparisons between different
ROs. So, one of the disadvantages of this design is the low ratio of the number of
response bits to the number of challenge bits ( 2 log1

2

N

).

The maximum number of possible comparisons between N different ROs is
equal to:

N ×(N −1)
.
2

However, not every comparison will result in an uncorrelated

response bit. For example, if A is greater than B and B is greater than C, then A
will be greater than C. Therefore, the comparison between A and C is correlated to
the comparisons between A and B, and B and C. It is shown in [3] that, selecting
and comparing the adjacent RO pairs (i.e., comparing RO1 with RO2 , RO2 with
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RO3 , RO3 with RO4 , etc.) eliminates the effect of this correlation. Thus, we
perform only N −1 comparisons out of the total number of comparisons, resulting
in a response which is N − 1 bits wide.

3.2.3 Anderson PUF
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Anderson PUF design is an example of the Glitch
PUFs which produce response bits from unwanted glitches in the circuit (Fig.
2.12 and 2.13). The response bit is decided based on the presence or absence of
a glitch signal on the output of the top carry-chain multiplexer (N2). The most
important factor that determines the quality of this design in terms of randomness
is the width of the produced glitch. If the glitch is too narrow, it will be damped
while it propagates through a wire which acts like a low pass filter. Thus, even if
a glitch is produced, the response will be 0 because the glitch is not seen by the
flip-flop. If the 2 shift register-multiplexer blocks, A and B, are located very close
to each other, the produced glitch will be too narrow and the response bits will
always be 0. In fact, 100% of the response bits will be 0 in this case. On the other
hand, if the 2 blocks, A and B, are located in a way that they are too far from each
other, a glitch will always be present on N2 and therefore, the response bit will
always be 1. The concept of tuning the glitch width is utilized in the proposed PUF
design to address this issue [8]. The idea is to widen the produced glitch so that
it is seen by the flip-flop. This is accomplished by inserting some intermediate
blocks between the blocks A and B, as shown in Fig. 3.2.
Note that, the shift registers in the intermediate blocks are initialized with all
1’s. So, they act like a simple wire. They only cause the transitions from B’s
output to take a little longer and therefore, the glitch will be widened. Now, if
too many intermediate blocks are inserted between A and B, the response bits will
be 1 with higher probability. So, all the possible number of intermediate blocks
should be tested in order to achieve the best result in terms of uniformity and
randomness. The best tuning was shown to be 5 intermediate blocks (shown in
Fig. 3.2) in [8]. Based on our tests, the tuning which resulted the best uniformity
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CLB i
SLICE

LUT A

PRE

SLICE

CLB j

SLICE

SLICE

LUT B

Figure 3.2: Tuning the glitch width in the Anderson PUF on a Virtex II platform
[8]
was also 5 intermediate blocks.

3.3 Design Concepts: The Proposed Hybrid PUF
In this section, we propose the idea of the Hybrid PUF structure. The idea is to
combine two (or more) available sources of randomness in a way to improve the
uniqueness while maintaining other important performance metrics. This structure is based on the Basic RO PUF which can be combined with any other PUF
unit that produces a random bit. The RO PUF and the Anderson PUF are combined using two methods and it is shown that the second method results in better
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performance. Therefore, we combine the RO PUF with the SR Latch PUF as another example using the second method only. Finally, the implementation results
are presented and discussed in Section 3.5.

3.3.1 RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF, Method 1
As previously discussed, the RO PUF uses the randomly generated RO frequencies to produce the response bits, and the Anderson PUF uses the shift registermultiplexer delay as its random parameter to generate the response bits. We try to
combine these two ideas to increase the PUF randomness. As shown in Fig. 2.12,
the Anderson PUF works in a clocked manner and the clock is the same for all
instances. Also note that, the inverters in the RO circuit are implemented using
lookup tables in the FPGA. Thus, an inverter in the RO circuit and a 1-bit buffer
can be used as LUT A and LUT B in the Anderson PUF design. Figure 3.3 shows
the proposed scheme.


0 or glitch





Enable

PRE
0

D

1

0
0

0

Q

0 or 1

1

1
clock

0 or clock

Figure 3.3: The proposed RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 1
Note that, the output of the inverter and the buffer are complement of each
other which is a requirement of the Anderson PUF. In fact, the proposed scheme
is similar to the Anderson PUF except the fact that, the clock of the system is
generated using a ring oscillator which can be different across different instances.
So, there are two sources of randomness in the scheme, one is the random clock
frequency generated by the RO and the other one is the lookup table-multiplexer
delay. The output of the flip-flop is AND’ed with the RO clock. Therefore, the
output of this scheme is either a 0 or a clock. Similar to the RO PUF structure
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(Fig. 2.5), this block is instantiated as many times as needed and the counter
values are compared after a specific run time to produce the required number of
response bits. Note that, if we have N number of blocks and if we compare
only the adjacent pairs, as discussed earlier, the number of response bits will be
N − 1. Let us consider two instances of this scheme, instance i and instance j.
Because each instance can have 2 different outputs, 0 or a random clock, there are
4 different scenarios shown in Table 3.1. As we can see, the response bit produced
in scenario 1 is 1, scenarios 2 and 3 will produce 0, and the response bit of the
scenario 4 will be either 0 or 1 (with probability of 0.5 for each of them). Note
that, the response bit is the comparison result of the two instances outputs after a
specific run time, similar to the Basic RO PUF scheme. Because the occurrence
probability of all scenarios are theoretically equal to 0.25, it is expected to have
37.5% (= (0.25 × 1 + 0.25 × 0.5) × 100%) of the response bits to be 1 and 62.5%
(= (0.25 × 1 + 0.25 × 1 + 0.25 × 0.5) × 100%) to be 0. This means that the
proposed method has a biased behavior toward the bit 0 and does not improve the
randomness of the response bits. The implementation results presented in Section
3.5 verify this fact.

Table 3.1: RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1 different scenarios
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Instance i output
Clock
0
0
Clock
Instance j output
0
0
Clock
Clock
Response bit
1
0
0
0 or 1

3.3.2 RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF, Method 2
Figure 3.4 shows method 2 for combining the RO PUF and the Anderson PUF.
The Anderson PUF implementation is exactly the same as the original Anderson
in terms of tuning and in the sense that the input clock to all instances are the
same. The Anderson output bit which is 0 or 1 (with theoretical probability of 0.5
for each of them), is connected to the select signal of the 2 − to − 1 multiplexer
in the ring oscillator circuit. If the select signal is 0, the ring oscillator will have 5
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inverters in its feedback loop and therefore, produces a clock with the frequency
of f5 . If the select signal is 1, there will be only 3 inverters in the feedback
loop which results in a clock with the frequency of f3 . Note that, f3 is always
greater than f5 because the frequency of a ring oscillator depends on its feedback
loop delay. A higher number of inverters in the feedback loop results in a larger
delay and a higher clock period and thus, a lower frequency. So, if there are two
instances of this block, instance i and instance j, there will be 4 different scenarios
based on the Anderson output bit. These scenarios along with their produced
response bits are listed in Table 3.2. Similar to Table 3.1, the produced response
bits are results of comparison between two instances frequencies.
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Figure 3.4: The proposed RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 2
Table 3.2: RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2 different scenarios
Instance i Anderson output
Instance j Anderson output
Response bit

Scenario 1
1
0
1

Scenario 2
0
0
0 or 1

Scenario 3
0
1
0

Scenario 4
1
1
0 or 1

The response bit produced in scenario 1 is 1, scenarios 2 and 4 will produce
either 0 or 1 (with probability of 0.5 for each of them), and the response bit of scenario 3 is 0. Because the occurrence probability of all scenarios are theoretically
equal to 0.25, we expect to have 50% (= (0.25×1+0.25×0.5+0.25×0.5)×100%)
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of the response bits to be 1 and 50% (= (0.25×1+0.25×0.5+0.25×0.5)×100%)
to be 0. This means that the proposed method maintains the 50% uniformity of the
response. It also has a potential to improve the uniqueness of the PUF response
because it produces the response bit using two sources of randomness instead of
one. The implementation results presented at the end of this chapter verify this
fact.
An interesting fact about the proposed scheme (Fig. 3.4) is that, even if the
occurrence probabilities of the scenarios are not equal to each other, the theoretical uniformity of the response will still remain 50%. The occurrence probability
of each scenario is determined by the probability of 1 and 0 generated by the Anderson PUF (or any other utilized PUF, the output of which is connected to the
select signal of the multiplexer). Let us denote P rob1 as the probability of the
generated select signal to be 1 and P rob0 as its probability of being 0. Note that
P rob1 = 1 − P rob0 . If the uniformity of the utilized PUF is 50%, we will have
P rob1 = P rob0 = 0.5 and thus, the occurrence probability of all scenarios will
be equal to 0.25, as discussed before. Here we assume the general case in which
P rob1 is not necessarily equal to P rob0 . In this case, the occurrence probabilities
of scenarios 1 and 3 are equal to P rob1 × P rob0 , the probability of scenario 2 is
equal to P rob20 , and the probability of scenario 4 is equal to P rob21 . Therefore, the
uniformity of the produced response will be equal to P rob1 ×P rob0 ×1+P rob20 ×
0.5 + P rob21 × 0.5 = P rob0 × (1 − P rob0 ) + 0.5 × P rob20 + 0.5 × (1 − P rob0 )2 =
P rob0 −0.5×P rob20 +0.5+0.5×P rob20 −P rob0 = 0.5. Thus, even if the utilized
PUF which generates the select signal does not have a uniform distribution of 0’s
and 1’s, the theoretical uniformity of the proposed PUF scheme will still remain
50%. Note that, the provided probability analysis is true only if the Basic RO PUF
is assumed to generate 1 or 0 with equal probability of 0.5. The implementation
results in Section 3.5 confirm that this assumption is true.
As another example shown in Fig. 3.5, the RO PUF and the SR Latch PUF
are combined using method 2. The Anderson block is simply replaced with the
SR Latch unit. Similar to the Anderson PUF, each SR Latch unit generates 1 bit

35

C HAPTER 3. I MPLEMENTATION R ESULTS

36

that can be connected to the select signal of the multiplexer. Note that, a flip-flop
is inserted on the enable input of the RO PUF so that both PUF units (RO and SR
Latch) are enabled synchronously.
Enable




LUT
(NAND)



ܳ

0 or 1





LUT
(NAND)



ܳത

1





0

݂ଷ or ݂ହ (݂ଷ > ݂ହ )

Figure 3.5: The proposed RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure

3.4 Implementation Details and the Measurement
System
In this section, the PUF design parameters and the response measurement system
are discussed.

3.4.1 Design Parameters
The design parameters used in this study are listed in Table 3.3. The number of
PUF units is determined by the required number of response bits and is only limited by the area constraints. The number of PUF units is set to 128 in all structures
but it can be much greater than this value. So, the number of response bits is 128
in the Anderson and the SR Latch PUFs. Also, the number of response bits is 127
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in the Basic RO PUF, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1, RO/Anderson Hybrid
PUF method 2, and the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF.

Table 3.3: PUF implementation parameters
Parameter

Symbol

FPGA chip

N/A

Number of PUF
instances (FPGA boards)
Ref Counter
clock frequency
Number of PUF units in
the challenge-response system
Number of stages
in each RO
Number of intermediate
blocks in Anderson PUF
Distance between the 2
NAND gates in the SR Latch

Value
Xilinx VIRTEX II
Pro XC2VP100

g

4

Ref Clock

25 MHz

N

128

u

5

N/A

5

N/A

1 CLB

Number of response bits

a

128 in Anderson PUF
128 in SR Latch PUF
127 in Basic RO PUF
127 in RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1
127 in RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2
127 in RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF

Counter run time

Run Time

30000 clock cycles

Counter size
Number of response
samples
PUF unit placement

N/A

32 bits

m

50

N/A

2-Dimensional

Also, the number of stages in the ring oscillator design is set to 5 which means
that 5 inverters are used in the feedback loop. Each ring oscillator uses 5 SLICEs
in 2 configurable logic blocks (CLBs). Note that, the ring oscillator is created as
a hard macro and is instantiated as many times as needed (128) in the top-level
PUF design. Figure 3.6 shows four identical ring oscillators implemented as hard
macros. All the ring oscillators are identically placed and routed. Thus, the only
random parameter which influences on the oscillation frequency is the delay of the
inverters. We have also used the hard macro technique in the SR Latch PUF and
the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF. Note that we cannot use the hard macro technique
in the other PUF structures, Anderson PUF, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1,
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and RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2, because in these structures, the PUF unit
requires a power (VCC/GND) component. Power components are no longer supported in the 5.1i FPGA Editor and later when creating hard macros. Therefore,
a similar technique proposed in [8] is used to make sure that the placement and
routing of all units are identical. This technique uses the rloc and AREA GROUP
physical constraints. Using these constraints, the designer can force the placement
and relative location of the components.

Figure 3.6: Four identical ring oscillators implemented as hard macros: the logic
in the white ellipse represents 1 ring oscillator.
Another important design parameter is the placement of the PUF units in the
chip. It is shown in [43] that, a systematic variation in the components delays in
a die exists in an FPGA chip. In other words, the correlated intra-die variation
causes a systematic pattern of the frequencies of several ring oscillators. As suggested by Maiti et al. in [3], the PUF units should be placed as close as possible to
each other to eliminate the effect of correlated or spatial intra-die variation. Several placement strategies are analyzed in [13]. Based on our initial experiments
on different placement strategies, we consider only the 2-Dimensional placement
strategy depicted in Fig. 3.7. In fact, this strategy shows the highest reliability
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and uniqueness among other strategies. All the PUF units in all PUF structures
are placed in the SLICE X56Y88:SLICE X87Y183 range so that the comparison between different structures is fair.
Finally, after implementing the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF scheme, it was noticed that the SR Latch PUF is so sensitive to the surrounding logic. In other
words, the high frequency clocks generated by the RO units affect the performance of the SR Latch and, as shown in Section 3.5, the reliability of this scheme
is the worst among all other implemented schemes. Also, the uniqueness of this
scheme does not seem to improve significantly.

FPGA
unit1

unit16

...

unit128

unit2

unit15

...

unit127

.
.
.

.
.
.

unit8

unit9

.
.
.
...

unit121

Figure 3.7: 2-Dimensional placement of PUF units
So, we separate the RO and SR Latch units as shown in Fig. 3.8 to reduce
the effect of the surrounding logic. It is shown in Section 3.5 that, separating
the RO and SR Latch units improves the reliability and uniqueness of the RO/SR
Latch Hybrid PUF scheme, significantly. The same method was applied on the
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2 but the improvements were negligible. It is
concluded that the Anderson PUF is not affected by the surrounding logic as much
as the SR Latch PUF.

3.4.2 Measurement System
Figure 3.9 depicts our measurement system block diagram. The user sends a start
signal via keyboard. It is transmitted to the FPGA board through the serial port
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Response
RO Bank

128

127

SR Latch
Bank

Figure 3.8: Separating the RO/SR Latch PUF units
of the computer. After receiving the start signal, the PUF starts generating the
response bits and when the response is ready, it is transmitted to the computer
through the serial transmitter. Note that, in this system, the user does not provide
the challenge to the PUF; instead, the challenges are applied internally to the
PUFs to produce the response bits. In addition, in the Anderson PUF and the SR
Latch PUF structures, all the 128 bits of response are obtained at the same time.
However, in a practical PUF, the user applies a specific challenge and checks the
response to verify the PUF instance. The challenge-response system implemented
in this work is only intended to analyze the performance of the PUF structures in
terms of reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing.
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Serial Transmitter
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Figure 3.9: The measurement system block diagram
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3.5 Results and Discussion
In this section, we provide the implementation results of the seven PUF structures:
SR Latch PUF, Basic RO PUF, Anderson PUF, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method
1, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2, and two implementations of the RO/SR
Latch Hybrid PUF. We compare the performance of all structures in terms of reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing. The reliability of all structures are
also analyzed under different environmental conditions such as different FPGA
chip ambient temperatures and supply voltage values. The schemes under study
are also compared with each other in terms of the area consumption of their PUF
units. Table 3.4 presents the implementation results in terms of reliability, uniformity, and uniqueness. In addition, figures 3.10 and 3.18 compare the uniqueness
and bit-aliasing of different structures, respectively.
As shown in Table 3.4, the average reliability is almost the same for the SR
Latch, Basic RO, and Anderson PUFs. Also note that, all the Hybrid PUF schemes
show a lower reliability level than other basic schemes (SR Latch, Basic RO,
and Anderson PUFs). This is because there are two sources of instability in the
Hybrid schemes. The source of instability in the Basic RO PUF is the unstable
frequency of a single ring oscillator. In other words, even the frequency of the
clock generated by a single RO is not constant. If the frequencies of two adjacent
ROs which produce 1 bit of response are so close to each other, the generated
response bit will be unstable due to noise effects. The same scenario happens in
the Anderson PUF, where a response bit is produced based on the relation between
the two shift register-multiplexer delays. If these delays are so close to each other,
the produced response bit will be unstable. In the case of the SR Latch PUF, if
the difference between the strength of the NAND gates is small, the produced
response bit (which is the settling state of the cell) will be unstable.
As mentioned before, the reliability of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF is the
worst among all schemes. We separate the RO and SR Latch units to investigate
the effect of the surrounding logic on the SR Latch PUF behavior. As shown in
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Table 3.4, the reliability of this scheme is significantly improved when the RO and
SR Latch units are separated. The same method was applied on the RO/Anderson
Hybrid PUF method 2. However, the improvements were not noticeable. Thus, it
is concluded that, the Anderson PUF behavior is not affected by the surrounding
logic, compared to the SR Latch PUF.

Table 3.4: Implementation results in terms of reliability, uniformity, and uniqueness (%)
PUF Scheme
SR Latch
Basic RO
Anderson
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2
RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF
RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF with
separated RO/SR Latch blocks

Reliability
Average Variance
98.8291 0.07458
99.0249 0.53151
98.9927 0.12851
98.444 0.20538
98.4757 0.44152
93.6325 7.09239

Uniformity
Average Variance
36.5156 53.10403
50.0551
6.16962
64.1328 372.50034
45.0669 17.30003
45.4016
8.51688
48.3071
5.02041

97.5325

49.4094

1.58409

18.75504

Uniqueness
36.1979
39.895
39.974
36.0892
48.5564
39.6325
46.063

In terms of uniformity, the Basic RO PUF and the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF
show the best performance among all schemes. The value of 50.0551% for the
uniformity of the Basic RO PUF confirms that the assumption made in the probability analysis provided in Section 3.3 is true. Additionally, the RO/Anderson
Hybrid PUF schemes maintain an acceptable level of uniformity, although the
Anderson PUF does not show a good value for this performance metric. This
behavior is totally reasonable based on the probability analysis provided in Section 3.3. The problem with the Anderson PUF scheme is the necessary tuning
process. We observed in our experiments that, when we tune the Anderson PUF
for 1 FPGA board, other boards do not seem be tuned at all. For example, the
uniformity of the tuned board is measured to be 50.6875% which is close to ideal.
Now, when the exact same design is implemented on another board, the uniformity shows to be 78.8594%. The high value of variance for uniformity of the
Anderson PUF is due to this variation among different boards. In addition, the SR
Latch PUF does not show a good value for uniformity. The average uniformity of
36.5156% represents a biased behavior of this PUF toward the bit 0, which is not
good for practical purposes.
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One of the most important indicators of a PUF randomness is the uniqueness
of its produced response. An ideal PUF has a uniqueness of 50%. As we can
see in Table 3.4, the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2 and the RO/SR Latch
Hybrid PUF with separated RO/SR Latch blocks show the best performance in
terms of uniqueness. This shows that, the proposed method takes advantage of
both sources of randomness properly. Figures 3.11, 3.12, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16,
and 3.17 show the distribution histogram of the Hamming distance between any
pair of PUF instances, and Fig. 3.10 compares the distribution histograms of
different structures.
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Figure 3.10: Comparison between different schemes in terms of Uniqueness

The best non-ideal PUF would have a normal distribution with the mean value
of 0.5. As shown in these figures, the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2 and
the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF with separated RO/SR Latch blocks show the best
Hamming distance distribution among other structures. Note that, the value of 0.5
is presented using the range [61:65] in the figures because we have 128 (or 127)
bits of response in different schemes and 0.5 × 128 = 64 (or 0.5 × 127 = 63.5).
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Figure 3.11: Uniqueness of the SR Latch PUF structure
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Figure 3.12: Uniqueness of the Basic RO PUF structure
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Figure 3.13: Uniqueness of the Anderson PUF structure
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Figure 3.14: Uniqueness of the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 1
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Figure 3.15: Uniqueness of the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 2
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Figure 3.16: Uniqueness of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure
Moreover, bit-aliasing of a PUF response is an important factor in assessing
the practicality and unclonability of a PUF structure. The ideal PUF has a bitaliasing of 0.5 for all bit positions. Figures 3.19, 3.20, 3.21, 3.22, 3.23, 3.24,
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Figure 3.17: Uniqueness of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure with separated
RO/SR Latch blocks
and 3.25 show the distribution histogram of the average Hamming weight across
different PUF instances, and Fig. 3.18 compares the distribution histograms of
different structures. The best non-ideal PUF would have a normal distribution
with the mean value of 0.5. So, the best schemes in terms of bit-aliasing among
the schemes under study are the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2 and the
RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF with separated RO/SR Latch blocks. This also verifies
the suitability of the proposed Hybrid scheme as a practical PUF.

60

50

Number of Bit Positions

SR Latch
Basic RO

40

Anderson
30
RO/Anderson method
1
RO/Anderson method
2
RO/SR Latch

20

10
RO/SR Latch with
separated blocks
0
0

0.25
0.5
0.75
Average Hamming Weight

1

Figure 3.18: Comparison between different schemes in terms of bit-aliasing
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Figure 3.19: Bit-aliasing of the SR Latch PUF structure
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Figure 3.20: Bit-aliasing of the Basic RO PUF structure
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Figure 3.21: Bit-aliasing of the Anderson PUF structure

C HAPTER 3. I MPLEMENTATION R ESULTS

48

35

Number of Bit Positions

30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0

0.25

0.5

0.75

1

Average Hamming Weight

Figure 3.22: Bit-aliasing of the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 1
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Figure 3.23: Bit-aliasing of the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF structure, method 2
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Figure 3.24: Bit-aliasing of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure
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Figure 3.25: Bit-aliasing of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure with separated
RO/SR Latch blocks
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Additionally, the effect of the FPGA board ambient temperature on the reliability of different PUF structures is investigated in this study. The ambient temperature is increased up to 70 degrees (◦ C) and the reliability of different schemes
is recorded for the temperatures 35, 40, 50, 60, and 70 ◦ C. Figure 3.26 shows the
results of this experiment. Note that, since the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure has the worst reliability among all other schemes, the reliability behaviors of
other structures are not distinguished well in Fig. 3.26. This is why we have also
provided Fig. 3.27 which is basically the same as Fig. 3.26 with the RO/SR Latch
Hybrid PUF structure removed so that the range of the graph distinguishes between different schemes, well. Changing the ambient temperature (in the studied
range) does not seem to have a significant influence on the reliability of different structures. Since all the PUF structures under study produce response bits
based on the mismatch between any two devices (e.g. the NAND gates in the SR
Latch PUF, the shift register-multiplexer in the Anderson PUF, RO frequency in
the Basic RO PUF, etc.), the temperature influences on the pair of devices almost
equally and in the same direction. Thus, the stability of the PUF response bits is
not affected by changing the ambient temperature, significantly.
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Figure 3.26: The effect of the ambient temperature on the reliability of different
PUF structures
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Figure 3.27: The effect of the ambient temperature on the reliability of all PUF
structures except the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF structure
Moreover, we analyze the effect of changing the FPGA chip supply voltage on
the reliability of different PUF schemes. The nominal supply voltage of the chip
is 1.5 V and we change it to 1.13, 1.22, 1.37, and 1.72 V . The result of this experiment is depicted in Fig. 3.28. Note that, the exact measured value for the nominal
voltage is 1.52 V . It can be observed that, changing the chip supply voltage does
not significantly influence the reliability of the Basic RO PUF, SR Latch PUF, Anderson PUF, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2, and RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF
with separated blocks. All these schemes maintain their reliability at a high level
even with the decrease or increase in the chip supply voltage. On the other hand,
the RO/SR latch Hybrid PUF shows an interesting trend for its reliability. In fact,
the nominal voltage surprisingly results in the worst reliability among other values
for the chip supply voltage. In addition, the reliability of the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1 with the chip supply voltage of 1.13 V is equal to 71.8663%,
which is the worst among all cases. The reliability of this scheme shows the highest sensitivity to the chip supply voltage, since it increases significantly when the
supply voltage is increased from 1.13 V to 1.22 V (increases to 94.9889%). It
also shows a noticeable growth (from 94.9889% to 99.6362%) when the supply
voltage is changed from 1.22 V to 1.37 V .
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Figure 3.28: The effect of the FPGA chip supply voltage on the reliability of
different PUF structures
Table 3.5: Comparison between different structures in terms of area consumption,
placement tuning requirement, and time per response bit
PUF Scheme
Basic RO
Anderson
SR Latch
RO/Anderson Hybrid
PUF method 1
RO/Anderson Hybrid
PUF method 2
RO/SR Latch Hybrid
PUF

No. of CLBs
2
5
2

Area
No. of SLICEs
5
6
2

No. of LUTs
6
8
2

No
Yes
Yes

Time per
bit (µs)
1200
0.08
0.04

6

12

7

Yes

1200

5

12

15

Yes

1200

4

9

9

Yes

1200

Tuning Required?

Finally, Table 3.5 compares different implemented structures in terms of area
consumption, placement tuning requirement, and required time per response bit.
Note that, except the Basic RO PUF, all other PUF units need a tuning process in
order to achieve the best randomness among the response bits. As we can notice,
all Hybrid PUF structures consume more area and logic resources than the basic
structures. Regarding the required time to produce a response bit, the Basic RO
PUF and all Hybrid schemes which are based on RO PUF consume much greater
time than the Anderson and SR Latch PUFs. This is because of the Run Time that
needs to be passed so that the produced response bit is more stable.
In summary, the proposed method of combining different PUF schemes is
shown to improve the uniqueness and thus, the randomness of the response, significantly. The added area overhead in our scheme is very small compared to
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other available methods in the literature. Also, our proposed Hybrid PUF does
not require any pre-processing or post-processing tasks performed on the input or
output of the PUF units. In addition to the uniqueness being increased significantly, other important PUF performance metrics are maintained at an acceptable
level. The proposed method is a general approach and can be further studied and
analyzed using other PUF schemes.

52

Chapter 4
Secret Sharing Based on Physically
Unclonable Functions
As previously discussed, two main categories of applications for PUFs have been
introduced and analyzed: authentication and secret key generation. In this chapter,
we introduce another important application for PUFs. In fact, we develop a novel
and efficient secret sharing scheme using a PUF to increase the information rate
and provide cheater detection capability for the secret sharing system.

4.1 Introduction
Secret sharing is a fundamental cryptographic primitive which is used in numerous applications such as secure information storage, Byzantine agreement [44],
threshold cryptography [45], secure multiparty computations [46–48], access control [49], attribute-based encryption [50, 51], and generalized oblivious transfer [52, 53]. Secret sharing was invented independently by Shamir [54] and Blakley [55] in 1979. In a basic scheme of secret sharing there are n players and a
dealer who has a secret s. The dealer divides the secret into n shares and gives
a share to each of the n players pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. This step is called the share
computation phase. Let us denote P as the set of all players in the system. An
authorized set is defined as any subset of P that can reconstruct the secret, in the
53
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secret reconstruction phase, only when all the players in that subset are present.
In fact, if at least one player in the authorized set is not present, other players in
that authorized set will have no information about the secret. The collection of all
the authorized sets is defined as the access structure of the scheme. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is based on the polynomial interpolation. In this scheme, the
dealer builds a random polynomial f (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 + . . . + ak−1 xk−1 by
selecting k − 1 random coefficients, a1 , a2 , . . ., ak−1 . Also, a0 is equal to the secret to be shared, s. Then, the dealer obtain n points on the polynomial, (i, f (i)),
where i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Each player receives a point as his share. Because the
polynomial is of degree k − 1, at least k points are needed to calculate all coefficients and reconstruct the polynomial. Once the coefficients are computed, a0
will be saved as the secret, s. This scheme is called (n, k)-threshold secret sharing scheme, meaning that, any subset of n players whose cardinality is equal to
or greater than a threshold, k, will be considered as an authorized set. In other
words, any k players will be able to reconstruct the secret, while less than k players will have no information about the secret. Ito et al. proposed and constructed
secret sharing schemes for general access structures in [56]. Even more efficient
schemes were proposed in [57–61].
Information rate is an important efficiency metric of a secret sharing scheme
and is defined as [62]:

ρ=

log |S|
max log |Sp |

(4.1)

where S is the set of secrets, |S| is the bit-size of the set S, and for any p ∈ P ,
the share of the player p is taken from the set Sp . In addition, max represents the
maximum function. In fact, the information rate, ρ, of a secret sharing scheme
is the ratio between the bit-size of the set of secrets and the maximum bit-size of
the corresponding shares given to the players. A secret sharing scheme is called
ideal if ρ = 1. Improving the information rate of a secret sharing scheme is an
important concern [63], which is addressed in this study.
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Another important issue associated with secret sharing schemes is dealing with
dishonest players. In such scenarios, if there is at least one player who fakes his
share, then other honest players cannot gain access to the secret. With some of
the shares being faked, the reconstructed secret, s′ , will be different from the original secret, i.e., s′ 6= s. A robust secret sharing scheme is a scheme which can
recover the shared secret even with the existence of some incorrect shares [64].
In fact, if up to t of the shares submitted by the players are fake, a robust secret
sharing scheme can still retrieve the original secret. Some known robust schemes
are covered in the next subsection. The robustness can be provided by attaching
additional redundancy to the shares given to the players. Adding redundancy to
the shares reduces the information rate, significantly. In this work, we address this
problem and propose, for the first time, a structural model of an efficient secret
sharing scheme with cheater detection capability, based on physically unclonable
functions. This scheme can be a new application of PUFs, in addition to authentication and secret key generation. Note that, with cheater detection capability, the
secret sharing scheme will not have to reconstruct the secret even with some fake
shares because there is always the possibility that the fake share is provided by an
illegitimate player. In this case, the scheme can identify and simply exclude the
cheaters from the authorized set.

4.2 Related Work
In this section, we briefly discuss the known robust secret sharing schemes. As
mentioned in [64], the robust secret sharing is impossible if the number of fake
shares is equal or greater than half of the players, i.e., t ≥ ⌈n/2⌉. There are two
main classes of secret sharing schemes which are robust in the case of t < ⌈n/2⌉
[64]. The first one is the one proposed by Rabin and Ben-Or in [65] based on an
unconditionally secure message authentication code. In this scheme, each player,
pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, receives an authentication key, keyji . The player pj can use his
authentication key, keyji , to verify if the share provided by player pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and i 6= j, is correct. In other words, each player can verify the correctness of all
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the shares with the help of his authentication keys. When a share is verified to be
correct by at least t + 1 players, it will be used to reconstruct the secret. As we
can see, each player receives Ω(nλ) bits in addition to their Shamir share, where
2−λ is the required failure probability in reconstructing the correct secret [64], n
is the number of players, and Ω declares the lower bound notation.
The second scheme is proposed by Cramer, Damgård, and Fehr [66]. In this
scheme, the dealer shares the secret s, which is an element of the finite field F,
i.e., s ∈ F among all the players using the standard Shamir scheme. In addition
to the original secret, the dealer shares a randomly chosen field element y ∈ F
and their product z = s · y ∈ F among the players. In the reconstruction phase,
the reconstructor performs the following for every subset of t + 1 players: he
reconstructs s′ , y ′, and z ′ which are supposed to be the secret, the random element,
and their product, respectively. Then, if the equation s′ · y ′ = z ′ holds, it outputs s′
to be the original secret. In fact, using the redundant information, y and z, given
to the players in addition to the actual secret, s, the reconstructor can retrieve the
secret with possibly partly incorrect shares of these t + 1 players. Compared to
Rabin and Ben-Or scheme, this scheme adds much less redundancy to the actual
share. However, the running time of this scheme is exponential in n, because
the reconstructor has to loop over all possible subsets of size t + 1 [64]. A new
robust secret sharing scheme that has the advantages of both the above schemes is
proposed in [64]. In fact, this scheme has the same low share size as Rabin and
Ben-Or scheme and yet, its share computation and secret reconstruction phases
run in polynomial time. The important problem associated with these schemes
is that they are not efficient schemes in terms of information rate. In this study,
a general method is proposed to build the existing secret construction schemes
using physically unclonable functions to improve efficiency.

4.3 Preliminaries
We construct our robust secret sharing scheme based on Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki’s
construction [56]. Note that, with a slight modification, our proposed model can
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be built based on other constructions, as well. In addition, the PUF which is used
in our design is a controlled PUF. Therefore, in this section, we briefly describe
and review Ito et al.’s secret construction and controlled PUFs.

4.3.1 Ito, Saito, and Nishizeki’s Constructions
A monotone access structure is an access structure in which, any subset that contains an authorized set, is also an authorized set. In Ito et al.’s secret construction,
the dealer shares the secret, s, independently for each authorized set Γ ∈ H, where
H is any monotone access structure. Let us assume that Γ includes l players. The
dealer chooses l − 1 random strings of bit-size equal to that of the secret, denoted
as r1 , r2 , . . ., rl−1 . The required length of these strings is determined by the secret
bit-size. The dealer then computes rl = s⊕r1 ⊕r2 . . .⊕rl−1 , where ⊕ is the bitwise
XOR operation. Next, the dealer gives the share ri to the player pi ∈ Γ. Note that,
the random strings selected by the dealer should be independent for each player
of each set Γ ∈ H. The reconstruction of the secret can be done only when all the
players in the set Γ pool their shares and compute s = r1 ⊕r2 . . .⊕rl−1 ⊕rl . On the
other hand, any unauthorized set of players which misses at least one player from
each authorized set will have no information about the secret. For the case where
at least one player from the authorized set fakes his share, the reconstructed secret
will be different from the original secret. Although in a general access structure,
any player can be a member of more than one authorized set, in this study, we
consider the case in which each player is included in only one authorized set, for
simplicity. However, this scheme can be extended for the general case, as well. In
this case, each player receives only one random string as their share and because
the bit-size of the random strings should be equal to that of the secret in the basic scheme, the information rate will be 1 which indicates an ideal secret sharing
scheme.

4.3.2 Controlled PUFs
The idea of controlled PUFs is introduced in [11, 12]. As shown in Fig. 4.1,
the idea is to apply an error correcting code (ECC) on the output of the PUF to
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improve its reliability. In addition, two hash functions are applied on the challenge
bits and the ECC output bits in order to restrict the attacker’s direct access to the
PUF challenge and response bits.
The actual challenge which is applied to the PUF and the PUF actual response
are c and r, respectively. However, the challenge and response that are exposed to
the outside world are C and R, and because a hash function is a one-way function,
the actual challenge and response (c and r) cannot be accessed from the outside
world. Of course, if the utilized hash algorithm is known to public, given the
challenge C, one can easily compute the actual challenge c (c = hash(C)). But
because hash functions are one-way functions, given the response R, one cannot obtain the actual response r. In addition, some of the PUF response bits are
erroneous or unstable due to noise effects and environmental variations. The error correcting code (ECC) can detect and correct these noisy bits with the help
of the Helper Data (W). In fact, for each challenge, C, the actual response is
fed into an ECC encoder to produce the helper data. This helper data along
with the challenge, C, are used to produce a 100% noise-free response, R, i.e.,
R = CP UF (C, W ).



Challenge (C)

Controlled PUF

Hash
Function

c

PUF

r

ECC

Hash
Function

Response (R)

Helper Data (W)

Figure 4.1: The basic idea of a controlled PUF [11, 12]

4.4 Our Proposed Model
4.4.1 Basic Scheme
In this subsection, we discuss our secret sharing scheme using a controlled physically unclonable function (CPUF) based on Ito et al.’s secret construction scheme.
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This scheme has three phases, initialization, share computation, and secret reconstruction. In the initialization phase, the trusted dealer applies different challenges with different bit-sizes to the controlled PUF and stores the corresponding
challenge-response pair in a secure database. It is explained in the security analysis subsection why different bit-sizes are needed. Also, a general rule on how
to decide the challenge bit-sizes is explained in that subsection. The dealer also
produces the helper data (W ) from each actual response (r) and stores it in the
database along with the corresponding challenge-response pair. In fact, the dealer
stores the challenge-response-helper data (C,R,W ) in the database. Note that, the
database should be a part of the dealer and it is assumed that the dealer cannot be
hacked, because if its security is compromised, the secret can be read out. Also
note that, the hash function input can be of variable bit-size while its output bitsize is fixed. Therefore, the challenges applied to the CPUF can have different bitsizes. In the share computation phase, the dealer chooses l − 1 different responses
from the database, R1 , R2 , . . ., Rl−1 and computes Rl = s ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2 . . . ⊕ Rl−1 .
Then, he gives the corresponding challenges that generate the chosen responses
along with the helper data to the players pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. In other words, the
player pi receives Ci and Wi , where Ri = CP UF (Ci , Wi ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1.
The dealer also gives Rl to the player pl .
In the reconstruction phase, the players p1 , p2 , . . ., pl−1 apply their challenges
to the CPUF and provide the helper data, and the corresponding responses are
XOR’ed with one another and the share provided by pl . This scheme is summarized in Fig. 4.2. Note that, because the CPUF is a one-way and more importantly, an unclonable function, the players will not have access to their actual
shares. Therefore, even if all the players are hacked and their stored shares are
read out by an attacker, the attacker will not be able to construct the secret unless
he has access to the original CPUF. In other words, in the existing schemes, if
an attacker has access to all players’ shares, he can retrieve the secret at his convenience. That is why most studies assume a limitation on the capability of the
attacker on how many players he can hack [62, 64]. However, it is not the case
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for our scheme. More importantly, if the attacker clones the CPUF circuit, he will
generate a wrong secret using all the shares. In addition, if one of the players
of the authorized set is not present in the reconstruction phase, other players will
have no information about the secret. This scheme, similar to the original scheme,
suffers from having dishonest players among the players in the authorized set. In
the next subsection, we propose a modified scheme which has cheater detection
capability. But before that, the information rate and the security of the proposed
scheme is analyzed briefly.



Basic Scheme Steps

1. The dealer applies different challenges to the controlled
PUF (CPUF).
2. The dealer stores the challenge-response-helper data
sets in a secure database.
3. The dealer chooses l-1 responses from the database: ܴଵ ,
ܴଶ , …, ܴିଵ .
4. The dealer computes ܴ ൌ ܴ۩ݏଵ ۩ܴଶ ǥ۩ܴିଵ .
5. The dealer gives ܥ and ܹ (corresponding to ܴ ) to
player  , ͳ  ݅  ݈ െ ͳ.
6. The dealer gives ܴ to player  .
7. The players ଵ , ଶ , …, ିଵ submit their shares to the
CPUF.
8. The corresponding responses (ܴଵ , ܴଶ , …, ܴିଵ ) are
XOR’ed with each other.
9. Player  submits his share (ܴ ).
10. ܴ is XOR’ed with the result of step 8 to generate the
secret.

Initialization Phase
Steps 1 and 2

Share Computation Phase
Steps 3 to 6

Reconstruction Phase
Steps 7 to 10

Figure 4.2: The Basic Scheme design steps
Information Rate
In this subsection, the information rate of the proposed scheme is computed and
compared with the information rate of the original Ito et al.’s construction scheme
[56]. It is shown that, the information rate of the proposed scheme can be even
more than 1 while maintaining the required security level. Let us define the response to challenge ratio for a given PUF as the ratio of the generated response
bit-size to the challenge bit-size, i.e., |r|/|c|. Usually, the bit-size of both challenge and response of a given PUF are fixed. However, in the controlled PUF
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scheme shown in Fig. 4.1, the bit-size of the challenge, C, can be variable, because the input to a hash function can be of variable length while its output length
is fixed. Also, the PUF should be designed in a way that, its response bit-size
is the same as that of the secret, i.e., |R| = |s|. Therefore, the share bit-size of
l − 1 players in this scheme will be equal to |Ci | + |Wi |, and the share bit-size
of player pl is equal to the secret bit-size which is equal to |Ri |. Note that, |Ci |
for each player can be different but the bit-size of the helper data (Wi ) which is
generated from the actual PUF responses is fixed for all players. The bit-size of
Wi is determined by the ECC algorithm used in Fig. 4.1. Now, if the following
condition is assumed to be true:

|Ci | + |Wi | < |Ri |

(4.2)

for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l−1, the information rate will be equal to 1 based on Eq. (4.1), i.e.,
ideal scheme, because the maximum share bit-size among all the players belongs
to the player pl . The inequality (4.2) will be satisfied only if the number of actual
response bits is greater than the number of the corresponding challenge, |ri | > |ci |
for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. This condition is a necessary condition but it is not sufficient.
The reason is that, the bit-size of the output response, Ri , is less than that of the
actual response, ri , because the input bit-size of the hash function is greater than
the output bit-size. Also, because the helper data, Wi may leak some information
about the actual response bits, the bit-size of the ECC output is less than |ri |.
For the same reason, the input challenge bit-size, |Ci |, is greater than the actual
challenge bit-size, |ci |. In summary, we have |Ci | > |ci | and |Ri | < |ri | for each
player pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. Therefore, having a response to challenge ratio greater
than 1 does not necessarily imply |Ci | + |Wi | < |Ri |. So, we should make sure
that we design the scheme in a way that it satisfies the inequality (4.2).
Up to now, it is shown that, both the original Ito et al.’s scheme and the proposed scheme have an information rate of 1 based on Eq. (4.1). However, our
proposed scheme has a very important difference from the original scheme. In
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the original scheme, the share bit-size of all the players are equal to that of the
secret. However, in our proposed scheme, only one player has a share of bit-size
equal to the secret bit-size, and the other players have smaller shares. In fact, if
the information rate is defined as [63]:

ρ=

log |S|
avg log |Sp |

(4.3)

where avg is the average function, the information rate of our proposed scheme
will be equal to:

|R|+

l×|R|
Pl−1
i=1 |Ci |+|Wi |

which can be even more than 1 if |Ci | + |Wi | <

|Ri | for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, as discussed before. In other words, it is a more
efficient scheme than the original Ito et al.’s construction scheme and all but one
of the players will receive smaller shares. Note that, the information rate of the
original scheme is still 1 based on the new equation (4.3).

Security Analysis
For security analysis of the proposed basic scheme, we consider a case where
all but one of the players pool their shares and try to retrieve the secret. In the
original scheme, because the bit-size of the shares of all players are the same and
are equal to the secret bit-size, the complexity of the brute-force approach to guess
the remaining share is equal to the complexity of the brute-force approach to guess
the secret, i.e., 2|s| . In the proposed scheme, the share bit-size of all but one of
the players is equal to |Ci | + |Wi | which is ideally less than |Ri | = |s|, to provide
an information rate of more than 1. Therefore, the complexity of the brute-force
approach to guess the remaining share is equal to 2|Ci |+|Wi| which is less than
2|s| . However, because the bit-size of the challenge applied to the controlled PUF,
|Ci |, can be variable, different players might have different share bit-sizes and
therefore, in this case, the l − 1 players will be able to guess the remaining share
with a small probability, which depends on the number of different challenge bitsizes generated by the trusted dealer. For example, let us assume that the secret
length is 500 bits and the shares given to the players can be of any length between
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200 and 500 bits. When all but one of the players cooperate with each other in
order to guess the remaining share and to eventually retrieve the secret, they would
notice that their own shares are of different bit-sizes. Therefore, the probability
that they will guess the length of the last share correctly will be equal to 1/300.
Note that, this probability is valid only if the players are aware of the range of the
valid share lengths. If this is not the case, the probability will be even less than
1/300. Given this small probability and the complexity of 2|Ci |+|Wi| , we can claim
that, the security of the system is not compromised. The share bit-sizes can be
chosen completely randomly. There is no specific requirement on how they are
chosen. Also, the range of the bit-sizes is not of critical importance as long as
they meet the information rate requirements. However, the number of bit-sizes
generated by the trusted dealer should be high enough to increase the resilience of
the system against brute-force attack.
Moreover, as previously discussed, even if an attacker obtains access to the
share of all the players in the authorized set, he will not be able to construct the
secret at his convenience because of the unclonability of the CPUF-based reconstructor.

4.4.2 Modified Scheme With Cheater Detection Capability
In this subsection, we propose a modified scheme, shown in Fig. 4.3 to provide
cheater detection capability for the basic scheme. In this scheme, the share bitsize given to each player is exactly the same as in the basic scheme. Therefore,
the information rate is the same as that of the basic scheme. However, additional
processing is performed by the dealer during the share computation phase and
also, extra memory and run time is added to the reconstruction phase. The system
works as follows: during the initialization phase, the trusted dealer applies different challenges with different bit-sizes (as in the basic scheme) to the controlled
PUF, generates a helper data from each actual PUF response, and stores the corresponding challenge-response-helper data (Ci , Ri , Wi ) set in a secure database.
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This procedure is similar to the initialization phase of our basic scheme explained
in the previous subsection. In the share computation phase, similar to the basic
scheme, the dealer chooses l − 1 responses, R1 , R2 , . . ., Rl−1 , and gives the corresponding challenge along with the generated helper data to each player. He also
gives Rl = s ⊕ R1 ⊕ R2 . . . ⊕ Rl−1 to the player pl . The only difference between
the modified and the basic schemes is that, in the modified scheme, the dealer
must choose different challenge bit-sizes for different players. This requirement
is highly recommended in the basic scheme, but in the modified scheme it is necessary. This is because the share bit-size is used as the players’ ID and therefore,
no redundant information is attached to the original shares to identify the players.
This way, we will have a set of valid IDs in the authorized set. Before sending the
share to each player, the dealer computes the message authentication code (MAC)
of the shares using a MAC algorithm and stores them along with the player’s ID
in a memory in the controlled PUF system which is used in the reconstruction
phase. Note the difference between this memory in the reconstruction system and
the database which is part of the dealer. The memory in the reconstruction system
can be have public access while the database of the dealer must be kept secure.
The dealer then distributes the shares among the players. In the reconstruction
phase, each player submits his share to the new system using the controlled PUF
shown in Fig. 4.3. In the figure, “Share (Ci ||Wi )” represents the share submitted
by player pi which is the concatenation of Ci and Wi .


Memory

Authenticated
Share (ܥ ||ܹ )

MAC
Algorithm

Match?

Y Share (ܥ ||ܹ )

CPUF

Response (ܴ )

N
Cheater Flag
(݂݈ܽ݃ )

Figure 4.3: The proposed modified scheme with cheater detection capability

C HAPTER 4. S ECRET S HARING BASED

ON

P HYSICALLY U NCLONABLE F UNCTIONS 65

The system first computes the MAC of the share and compares it with that
stored in the memory. As mentioned before, the system uses the share bit-size to
identify the player. If the computed MAC of the share is matched with that stored
in the memory, the share (the challenge along with the corresponding helper data)
will be applied to the CPUF to generate the corresponding response. This process
is performed for all the l − 1 players and the responses will be bit-wise XOR’ed.
Finally, the XOR result will be XOR’ed with the share provided by the player
pl to reconstruct the secret. This scheme is summarized in Fig. 4.4. It is noted
that, if one of the players of the authorized set is not present in the reconstruction
phase, other players will have no information about the secret. In addition, the
cheater detection capability is added to the system using the MAC procedure. If
the computed MAC of the share is not matched with that stored in the memory,
a flag will be set and the system will identify the cheater and the secret will not
be reconstructed. Now, depending on the application and its policies, the cheater
can be treated in different ways. He might receive a warning and will have a
chance to provide his share again, or his trustability level will be reduced, or
he will be removed from the authorized set permanently. Note that, the cheater
detection capability of the system depends on the preimage resistance or the oneway property of the hash function used in the MAC algorithm.
If the player fakes his share in a way that, the bit-size of the share is also
changed, there will be 2 different cases. In the first case, the system identifies
the player as a cheater because the faked share bit-size is not a valid bit-size. In
the second case, the system will identify the player as another player in the authorized set (this will happen if the faked share bit-size is a valid bit-size). Then it will
compare the MAC of the faked share with the one stored in the memory. If they
do not match (which will be the case because of the second preimage resistance
property of hash functions), the misidentified player, which could be an honest
player, will be identified as a cheater. This problem can be resolved by having
the players submit their shares sequentially in a pre-specified order to identify the
cheaters correctly. Another way to address this problem is to attach a random ID
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Modified Scheme Steps

1. The dealer applies different challenges to the controlled PUF
(CPUF).
2. The dealer stores the challenge-response-helper data sets in a
secure database.
3. The dealer chooses l-1 responses from the database: ܴଵ , ܴଶ ,
…, ܴିଵ .
4. The dealer computes ܴ ൌ ܴ۩ݏଵ ۩ܴଶ ǥ۩ܴିଵ .
5. (optional) The dealer selects a random ID for each player
(ܦܫ for  ).
6. The dealer computes the MAC of each player’s share
(ܥ ȁȁܹ ) and stores the MAC along with the player’s ID in
the memory.
7. The dealer gives ܥ and ܹ (corresponding to ܴ ) in addition
to ܦܫ (if applicable) to player  , ͳ  ݅  ݈ െ ͳ.
8. The dealer gives ܴ in addition to ܦܫ (if applicable) to
player  .
9. The players ଵ , ଶ , …, ିଵ submit their shares to the
CPUF.
10. The MAC of the submitted share of each player is compared
with the one stored in the memory.
11. The corresponding responses (ܴଵ , ܴଶ , …, ܴିଵ ) are XOR’ed
with each other if no cheater flag is set.
12. Player  submits his share (ܴ ).
13. ܴ is XOR’ed with the result of step 11 to generate the
secret.

Initialization Phase
Steps 1 and 2

Share Computation Phase
Steps 3 to 8

Reconstruction Phase
Steps 9 to 13

Figure 4.4: The Modified Scheme design steps
to the share given to each player (IDi given to the player pi ) and storing that ID in
the system memory along with the share MAC. In this case, although we lose efficiency and the information rate will be reduced, we can identify such cases if the
share bit-size and the random ID submitted by the player do not match. Therefore,
the information rate will be equal to:

|R|+|IDl |+

l×|R|
Pl−1
,
i=1 |Ci |+|IDi |+|Wi |

where |IDi | is

the bit-size of the i-th player ID.
Note that, if the dishonest players are able to read out the data stored in the
reconstruction system memory via invasive physical attacks, they will not be able
to compromise the security of the system because of the second preimage resistance property of hash functions. In other words, the cheater cannot fake his share
in a way that, its MAC matches the one stored in the memory. Also note that, it is
assumed that the communication between the dealer and the players is secure in
all existing schemes, because if it is not, the shares can be seen by other players
and the secret sharing scheme will be of no use.
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The most important issue in the proposed approach is the case in which the
player pl fakes his share. In fact, when all other players submit their shares correctly and thus, no flag has been set, i.e., f lagi = 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1, the player
pl will submit his share to reconstruct the secret. We define this player’s share as
a critical share because of the following reason: if this player fakes his share, the
generated secret will be wrong, s′ 6= s. The fact that the generated secret is wrong
and no cheater flag has been set helps the system to identify pl as the cheater. This
problem also exists in the original secret construction scheme. However, in our
proposed model, we can absolutely detect this player, pl as a cheater. Therefore,
in the share computation phase, we should make sure that we give this critical
share to a player with the highest trustability level. If this player cheats, we can
remove him from the authorized set permanently or we can reduce his trustability
level, depending on the application policies.
The important issue is that, the player pl can fake his share so that the generated secret is wrong. Then, he can use his share and the generated wrong secret to
compute the correct secret at his convenience. In addition, the dealer can compute
the MAC of Rl before giving it to the player pl and store the MAC in the memory.
In the reconstruction phase, the authenticity of the share of this player will also be
verified using the same procedure and a flag will be set if it is not matched with
the one stored in the memory. Again the bit-size of the share which in this case
is equal to that of the secret can be used to identify the player. Because the proposed model helps the system to identify such case, further actions can be made to
shut down the system, for example, to re-compute the shares, and to build a new
system with a new secret.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, the main contribution of the proposed
scheme is its efficiency in terms of information rate and the shares’ bit-size. In
fact, the idea of computing the MAC of the shares and using the MAC to verify
the authenticity of the submitted shares, can be applied to the original Ito et al.’s
construction scheme to provide cheater detection capability. However, in that
case, the information rate will be 1 at its best. It could be even less than 1 in the
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case that, the ID of the players are attached to their actual shares to distinguish
between different players. In contrast, in our proposed scheme, the information
rate can be more than 1 even in the latter case. We achieve this efficiency at the
expense of extra hardware for the CPUF, extra memory for the secure database,
and the extra initialization phase where the dealer should apply the challenges and
store the challenge-response-helper data sets in its database. Another important
contribution of this study is that, the ability of an attacker on hacking the players
is not required to be limited to a specific number of players. In other words, an
attacker can hack all the players in the access structure, and yet, he will not be
able to compute the secret at his own convenience due to the unclonability of the
PUF-based reconstructor.

Security Analysis
In subsection 4.4.1 we performed a security analysis for the proposed basic scheme
and showed its resilience against the brute-force approach. The same analysis can
be performed for the modified scheme against the same attack. In this subsection,
another important scenario is considered, in which all but one of the players try
to obtain information about the secret by submitting false shares. In other words,
dishonest players submit false shares in order to deceive the honest player. Then,
based on the obtained incorrect secret and using their correct shares, they will obtain information about the correct secret. This is the main attack on secret sharing
schemes and a secure scheme is defined to be resilient against this attack [62].
We can observe that, our scheme is also resilient against this attack because this
attack works only for the schemes which cannot detect the cheaters. Our proposed
scheme offers cheater detection capability to the system and identifies the dishonest player by setting a cheater flag. In fact, the honest players will not submit
their shares when a cheater flag is set. Therefore, dishonest players cannot gain
information about other honest players’ shares to compute the secret at their own
convenience.
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4.4.3 PUF requirements
In this subsection, the features of a good PUF that can be used in the proposed
model to meet the requirements of our secret sharing scheme are discussed. Besides a high reliability and a close-to-ideal uniqueness which represents the randomness of the response bits, the utilized PUF should have a large set of challengeresponse pairs. This allows each challenge-response pair to be used only once to
prevent modeling attacks against the PUF design. Also, the number of response
bits should be large enough and equal to the secret bit-size. Another important
factor of the utilized PUF is the challenge-response ratio which ideally should be
much greater than 1, i.e., |r|/|c| ≫ 1, so that the information rate of the proposed
secret sharing scheme can be even more than 1.

Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
In this study, we have implemented three known PUF structures, SR Latch PUF,
RO PUF and Anderson PUF, on four identical FPGA boards and have investigated
their performance in terms of reliability, uniqueness, uniformity, and bit-aliasing.
We have also proposed a Hybrid PUF scheme in which two PUF schemes are
combined with each other to improve the randomness of the response. The performance of this scheme is investigated using two examples. In the first one, RO
PUF and Anderson PUF are combined with each other; and in the second example, the SR Latch PUF is combined with RO PUF. Implementation results show
that, the proposed Hybrid PUF scheme improves the uniqueness and thus, the
randomness of the produced response, significantly.
In addition, we have proposed an efficient secret sharing scheme with cheater
detection capability based on physically unclonable functions (PUFs). The PUF
can generate the random strings that are required for the secret construction scheme.
Additionally, the one-way property and the response to challenge ratio of the PUF
is used to build our scheme and analyze its efficiency in terms of information rate.
It is shown that, under one condition, the information rate can be even more than
1, meaning that the players will receive smaller shares. The proposed scheme can
detect the cheaters while maintaining the required efficiency. Also, the security of
the proposed scheme against brute-force attack and two other known scenarios is
analyzed to show the resilience of the proposed scheme against these attacks.
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The results presented in this work are all obtained by implementing the schemes
on only four FPGA boards. The statistical analysis will be more valid if a larger
number of PUF instances are used. Also, the proposed Hybrid PUF can be implemented in an authentication and/or secret key generation scheme in order to verify
its ability to be used in such applications. Additionally, as discussed previously,
the proposed Hybrid PUF is a general method and its characteristics can be further investigated using other combinations. Regarding the proposed secret sharing
scheme based on PUFs, detailed security analysis can be performed against mush
elaborated attacks. Finally, the proposed method can be applied to other existing
secret sharing schemes in order to verify its contribution.
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Appendix A
Response Samples
In this appendix, we provide the estimated response of each implemented PUF
structure instance. We have seven different structures, SR Latch PUF, Basic RO
PUF, Anderson PUF, RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1, RO/Anderson Hybrid
PUF method 2, and two implementations of the RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF which
are described in details in Chapter 3. We have also four identical FPGA evaluation
boards which use the Xilinx Virtex II Pro XC2VP100 FPGA chip. We implement
each PUF structure on each board and we take 50 samples of the produced response of each PUF instance. Based on these samples, we estimate the response
of each PUF instance. Note that, the number of response bits of the SR Latch and
Anderson PUF is 128 while other PUFs produce 127-bit responses. The responses
are represented in the hexadecimal format.
SR Latch PUF:
Board #1: 06 07 8C 81 44 06 06 80 D6 4F CC 94 17 17 18 6A
Board #2: 4E 84 0C 44 04 18 CE 15 DE 17 4D 1C 87 9D 30 70
Board #3: 45 87 9F 4D 46 CF 86 41 07 17 05 0E 04 D4 21 69
Board #4: 15 16 06 05 07 06 44 51 45 10 06 01 86 08 40 21
Basic RO PUF:
Board #1: 28 88 5B 57 28 82 BD 7F 4A 4C CE F5 58 A8 BD 6B
Board #2: 4A C8 F5 2D 9D 51 C5 BE AA AA 4D A7 08 A5 B4 AF
Board #3: 00 44 EA 7E 04 A6 3F DD 4A 4C D7 7D 58 A5 6C EF
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Board #4: 08 A4 D7 EF 45 0A 66 AD 68 84 C5 DF 14 04 72 AB
Anderson PUF:
Board #1: FB FF FB 7B DA 77 F3 FF F9 FF DB 7D E9 FF BF DF
Board #2: 7A 7A B8 7C F2 24 03 F9 4A AF A2 74 D1 7A 4F 14
Board #3: FA FD EB BF FB B7 F3 FD 7A FD F1 BF FB 7E DE DF
Board #4: 5B A0 31 B6 82 A1 80 64 A8 F7 29 25 7A 35 8C 9E
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF, method 1:
Board #1: 14 52 C8 53 B2 12 80 9A 85 4E D1 4A D2 5D 58 7B
Board #2: 15 25 E4 59 FA 2A 89 36 CD 55 D2 5B 90 D5 B3 6B
Board #3: 10 8B EC 18 B2 02 94 0F 80 57 81 2F 80 57 05 F7
Board #4: 12 21 F2 16 CB 2A C0 9A 91 55 91 33 91 12 6E F7
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF, method 2:
Board #1: 16 18 E2 B3 4A 2B DA 96 42 DA 91 97 D2 EB 6A D4
Board #2: 11 54 A9 5D 19 0D E0 1E 92 1D 52 64 D5 99 53 5A
Board #3: 18 23 CA CC A6 6A D2 4A 96 43 32 56 A2 95 92 BE
Board #4: 12 54 9A A6 A2 17 17 2A 84 36 C0 4A A1 54 96 AF
RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF:
Board #1: 14 F1 37 6F 53 DB AB B3 14 0E 43 6A D4 4A 2B EA
Board #2: 15 14 A2 E6 D5 0D 2A 6A 5C 94 32 6F 94 95 33 43
Board #3: 14 17 69 6F 14 CD 37 72 C5 95 02 6E 04 17 0A 6F
Board #4: 55 10 E3 72 99 54 49 D3 95 34 E6 C3 C5 12 B7 6F
RO/SR Latch Hybrid PUF with separated RO/SR Latch units:
Board #1: 32 2B 39 5C A1 8F AB 5E A2 43 17 5A D2 E3 7A 54
Board #2: 74 38 A6 95 1B 8A 81 B4 C2 95 56 8A A2 AD 81 A2
Board #3: 46 63 8F AD 5A AA 55 BE A6 93 1E DB 82 95 C8 DB
Board #4: 37 92 4D 63 22 86 C5 72 AA 4C A6 DF 23 22 D6 BF
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Appendix B
Hybrid PUF VHDL Code
In this appendix, we provide the VHDL codes for the RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF
method 1 and RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2. Note that, only the PUF units
source codes are provided here. Other codes related to the control unit, challengeresponse system, and the measurement system are not provided. Also, note that,
part of the code which is related to the Anderson PUF implementation is obtained
(and modified for our platform) from Dr. Anderson’s personal web page.
RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 1:
library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;
Library UNISIM;
use UNISIM.vcomponents.all;

entity Hybrid1 is
Port (enable : in
output : out

STD_LOGIC;
STD_LOGIC

);
end Hybrid1;

architecture Behavioral of Hybrid1 is

signal OUT_INT

: STD_LOGIC;

signal OUT_INT2

: STD_LOGIC;

signal OUT1 : STD_LOGIC;
signal OUT2 : STD_LOGIC;
signal OUT3 : STD_LOGIC;
signal Int_O1

: STD_LOGIC;
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signal CARRY_BW

: STD_LOGIC;

signal CARRY_BW2 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW3 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW4 : STD_LOGIC;
signal C

: STD_LOGIC_vector (4 downto 0);

attribute keep

: string;

attribute keep of C : signal is "TRUE";
attribute S : string;
attribute S of C : signal is "TRUE";

--controlling the placement of the components
attribute rloc: string;
attribute rloc of FDCPE_inst : label is "X-2Y4";
attribute rloc of FDCPE_inst2

: label is "X-2Y-1";

attribute rloc of LUT1_inst_Buf

: label is "X0Y4";

attribute rloc of LUT1_inst_Inv

: label is "X0Y0";

attribute rloc of MUXCY_inst

: label is "X0Y4";

attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst

: label is "X0Y3";

attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst2

: label is "X0Y2";

attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst3

: label is "X0Y1";

attribute rloc of MUXCY_inst2
attribute rloc of inst_inv2
attribute rloc of inst_Inv

: label is "X0Y0";

: label is "X-2Y2";
: label is "X-1Y1";

attribute rloc of inst_nand

: label is "X-1Y2";

attribute rloc of inst_Inv3

: label is "X-2Y1";

attribute rloc of inst_and

: label is "X-2Y3";

begin

inst_nand : LUT2
generic map (
INIT => X"7") -- initialized as a NAND
port map (
O => C(0), -- LUT general output
I0 => enable, -- LUT input
I1 => C(4) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01") -- initialized as a NOT
port map (
O => C(1), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(0) -- LUT input
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);

inst_Inv2 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => C(2), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(1) -- LUT input
);

LUT1_inst_Buf : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "10") -- initialized as a Buffer
port map (
O => out1, -- LUT general output
I0 => C(2) -- LUT input
);

LUT1_inst_Inv : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => out2, -- LUT general output
I0 => C(2) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv3 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => C(4), -- LUT general output
I0 => out2 -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv4 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => out3, -- LUT general output
I0 => C(4) -- LUT input
);

MUXCY_inst : MUXCY
port map (
O => OUT_INT, -- Carry output signal
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CI => CARRY_BW4, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => out1 -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst : MUXCY --intermediate multiplexers
port map (
O => CARRY_BW4, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW3, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => ’1’ -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst2 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW3, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW2, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => ’1’ -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst3 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW2, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => ’1’ -- MUX select
);

MUXCY_inst2 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW, -- Carry output signal
CI => ’1’, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => out2 -- MUX select
);

-- this FF captures the glitch
FDCPE_inst : FDCPE
generic map (
INIT => ’0’) -- Initial value of register (0 or 1)
port map (
Q => OUT_INT2, -- Data output
C => out3, -- Clock input
CE => ’0’, -- Clock enable input
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CLR => ’0’, -- Asynchronous clear input
D => OUT_INT2, -- Data input
PRE => OUT_INT -- Asynchronous set input
);

FDCPE_inst2 : FDCPE
generic map (
INIT => ’0’) -- Initial value of register (?0? or ?1?)
port map (
Q => Int_O1, -- Data output
C => out3, -- Clock input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLR => ’0’, -- Asynchronous clear input
D => OUT_INT2, -- Data input
PRE => ’0’ -- Asynchronous set input
);

inst_and : LUT2
generic map (
INIT => X"8") -- initialized as an AND
port map (
O => OUTPUT, -- LUT general output
I0 => Int_O1, -- LUT input
I1 => out3 -- LUT input
);

end Behavioral;

RO/Anderson Hybrid PUF method 2:

library IEEE;
use IEEE.STD_LOGIC_1164.ALL;

Library UNISIM;
use UNISIM.vcomponents.all;

entity Hybrid2 is
Port (clk : in std_logic;
enable : in

STD_LOGIC;

output : out

STD_LOGIC

);
end Hybrid2;

architecture Behavioral of Hybrid2 is

signal sel : STD_LOGIC;
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signal C: STD_LOGIC_vector (5 downto 0);
signal OUT_INT : STD_LOGIC;
signal OUT_INT2 : STD_LOGIC;
signal O1, O2 : STD_LOGIC;
signal Int_O1, Int_O2, Int_O3, Int_O4 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW1 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW2 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW3 : STD_LOGIC;
signal CARRY_BW4 : STD_LOGIC;

attribute keep : string;
attribute keep of C : signal is "TRUE";
attribute S: string;
attribute S of C: signal is "TRUE";

attribute rloc: string;

attribute rloc of inst_nand: label is "X-2Y0";
attribute rloc of inst_Inv: label is "X-2Y1";
attribute rloc of inst_Inv2: label is "X-1Y0";
attribute rloc of inst_Inv3: label is "X-1Y1";
attribute rloc of Multiplexer0: label is "X-2Y2";
attribute rloc of inst_Inv4: label is "X-2Y3";
attribute rloc of inst_Inv5: label is "X-1Y2";
attribute rloc of SRL16E_inst: label is "X0Y5";
attribute rloc of Int_SRL16E_inst: label is "X0Y4";
attribute rloc of Int_SRL16E_inst2: label is "X0Y3";
attribute rloc of Int_SRL16E_inst3: label is "X0Y3";
attribute rloc of SRL16E_inst2: label is "X0Y2";
attribute rloc of MUXCY_inst: label is "X0Y5";
attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst: label is "X0Y4";
attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst2: label is "X0Y3";
attribute rloc of Int_MUXCY_inst3: label is "X0Y3";
attribute rloc of MUXCY_inst2: label is "X0Y2";
attribute rloc of FDCPE_inst: label is "X-2Y4";
attribute rloc of FDCPE_inst2: label is "X-2Y1";

begin

inst_nand : LUT2
generic map (
INIT => X"7") -- initialized as a NAND
port map (
O => C(0), -- LUT general output
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I0 => enable, -- LUT input
I1 => C(5) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01") -- initialized as a NOT
port map (
O => C(1), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(0) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv2 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => C(2), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(1) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv3 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => C(3), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(2) -- LUT input
);

Multiplexer0 : MUXCY
port map (
O => C(4), -- Carry output signal
CI => C(1), -- Carry input signal
DI => C(3), -- Data input signal
S => sel -- MUX select
);

inst_Inv4 : LUT1
generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => C(5), -- LUT general output
I0 => C(4) -- LUT input
);

inst_Inv5 : LUT1
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generic map (
INIT => "01")
port map (
O => output, -- LUT general output
I0 => C(5) -- LUT input
);

SRL16E_inst : SRL16E -- the "top" shift register instance
generic map (
INIT => X"5555")
port map (
Q => O1, -- SRL data output
A0 => ’1’, -- Select[0] input
A1 => ’1’, -- Select[1] input
A2 => ’1’, -- Select[2] input
A3 => ’1’, -- Select[3] input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLK => CLK, -- Clock input
D => O1 -- SRL data input
);

Int_SRL16E_inst : SRL16E -- Intermediate blocks
generic map (
INIT => X"FFFF")
port map (
Q => Int_O1, -- SRL data output
A0 => ’1’, -- Select[0] input
A1 => ’1’, -- Select[1] input
A2 => ’1’, -- Select[2] input
A3 => ’1’, -- Select[3] input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLK => CLK, -- Clock input
D => ’1’ -- SRL data input
);

Int_SRL16E_inst2 : SRL16E
generic map (
INIT => X"FFFF")
port map (
Q => Int_O2, -- SRL data output
A0 => ’1’, -- Select[0] input
A1 => ’1’, -- Select[1] input
A2 => ’1’, -- Select[2] input
A3 => ’1’, -- Select[3] input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
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CLK => CLK, -- Clock input
D => ’1’ -- SRL data input
);

Int_SRL16E_inst3 : SRL16E
generic map (
INIT => X"FFFF")
port map (
Q => Int_O3, -- SRL data output
A0 => ’1’, -- Select[0] input
A1 => ’1’, -- Select[1] input
A2 => ’1’, -- Select[2] input
A3 => ’1’, -- Select[3] input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLK => CLK, -- Clock input
D => ’1’ -- SRL data input
);

SRL16E_inst2 : SRL16E -- the "bottom" shift register instance
generic map (
INIT => X"AAAA")
port map (
Q => O2, -- SRL data output
A0 => ’1’, -- Select[0] input
A1 => ’1’, -- Select[1] input
A2 => ’1’, -- Select[2] input
A3 => ’1’, -- Select[3] input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLK => CLK, -- Clock input
D => O2 -- SRL data input
);

MUXCY_inst : MUXCY
port map (
O => OUT_INT, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW4, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => O1 -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW4, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW3, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
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S => Int_O1 -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst2 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW3, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW2, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => Int_O2 -- MUX select
);

Int_MUXCY_inst3 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW2, -- Carry output signal
CI => CARRY_BW, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => Int_O3 -- MUX select
);

MUXCY_inst2 : MUXCY
port map (
O => CARRY_BW, -- Carry output signal
CI => ’1’, -- Carry input signal
DI => ’0’, -- Data input signal
S => O2 -- MUX select
);

-- This FF captures the glitch
FDCPE_inst : FDCPE
generic map (
INIT => ’0’) -- Initial value of register
port map (
Q => OUT_INT2, -- Data output
C => CLK, -- Clock input
CE => ’0’, -- Clock enable input
CLR => ’0’, -- Asynchronous clear input
D => OUT_INT2, -- Data input
PRE => OUT_INT -- Asynchronous set input
);

FDCPE_inst2 : FDCPE
generic map (
INIT => ’0’) -- Initial value of register
port map (
Q => sel, -- Data output
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C => CLK, -- Clock input
CE => enable, -- Clock enable input
CLR => ’0’, -- Asynchronous clear input
D => OUT_INT2, -- Data input
PRE => ’0’ -- Asynchronous set input
);

end Behavioral;
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